

**PATRICK J. HURLEY AND AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARD CHINA, 1944-1945**

With Annotations and Introduction

By *Russell D. Bahite**

INTRODUCTION

Born in southeastern Oklahoma to parents of Irish descent, Patrick J. Hurley had an interesting career. He grew up with Choctaw Indians and coal miners. What formal education he had, he received at Indian schools in Oklahoma and later at National University Law School in Washington, D. C., where he took a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1908. He became a lawyer in his home state, gained considerable wealth, and dabbled in politics. During World War I, he served first in the judge advocate general's department in Washington and then later on the staff of General Ernest Hines in France. In the late twenties, he became a prominent Republican in Oklahoma and during the Hoover administration became Secretary of War. Since he held the rank of colonel in the reserves, when the United States entered the war in 1941, Hurley became a brigadier general and served first as a liaison officer between General Douglas MacArthur in Australia and officials in Washington. He then became a kind of roving emissary for President Roosevelt, serving in various quarters, and in 1944 was called upon to go to China to mitigate the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Chief of Staff of Chiang's army, General Joseph Stilwell and to help reverse the deteriorating political and military situation there. In 1944, Hurley was appointed United States Ambassador to China.

A self-made man and professed individualist blessed with considerable intellectual talent, Hurley early displayed a driving ambition to succeed. He hoped to live down his meager beginnings and to compensate for his feelings of inferiority about the part of the country from which he came. He did so to a remarkable extent; and his was indeed the fabled "rags to riches" story. He was physically attractive, exceedingly gregarious, a colonial egotist, and tremendously vain. Accompanying his vanity and ego was an all-consuming pride which would

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not allow him to admit failure or defeat. Thus, when he did not succeed in bringing unity in China, he found it impossible to accept his "failure" and he sought scapegoats.

Hurley served as Ambassador to China until the fall of 1945 when he resigned in a huff, charging that certain foreign service officers had been undermining American policy and had prevented his securing agreement between Chinese Nationalists and Communists. The officers on their part believed that the United States should have attempted closer cooperation with the Communists during the last year of the war, in part because they believed that force to be the chief opponent to Japan within China and, in part, because they believed that Chiang Kai-shek did not have widespread support. Hurley was willing to work with the Communists but refused to do anything that would imply that he was not working for unity within China through the Chiang government. In late 1945, fighting broke out between Communists and Nationalists, the Communists ultimately achieving power in 1949.

Immediately after resigning, Hurley continued hurling wild and irresponsible charges which suggested that a pro-communist conspiracy within the State Department had caused the failure in United States policy. He made several appearances before Congressional investigating committees in the post-war era and carried on a brisk correspondence reiterating his view. He also made the matter an issue in his campaigns for the United States Senate from New Mexico in 1946 and 1948. The following letter (exact copy) to his friend, former President Hoover is an accurate expression of his position.

--Russell D. Buhite

EX-PRESIDENT HOOVER'S INQUIRY

The Waldorf-Astoria Towers
New York 22, New York
December 27, 1949

My dear Pat:

In preparing some material for the use of our friends in the China matter, I have been going over the "White Book." I am wondering if you could help me out on the following points:

On page 66 or 67 of the above are two partial cables given from Roosevelt to Chiang. Do you have a copy of the full cables that I could see? Or do you recollect to what the suppressed parts referred?

The well-known names of Algernon Him, Owen Lattimore, John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent appear in documentation. The names of John F. Davies and Raymond Ludden also appear, but I have no data about them. Was Ambassador Gauss a left-winger?

I am wondering if Stalin and Molotov were not lying to you when they said they had no interest in Mao Tse-tung's Communists? It now develops that Mao was a frequent visitor to Moscow and the recent speech of Georgi Malenkov indicates they take pride in having built up the whole performance. Have you any other information on this point?

Yours faithfully,
Herbert Hoover

Honorable Patrick J. Hurley
Shoreham Building
Washington, D. C.

PATRICK J. HURLEY'S REPLY

January 11, 1950

Honorable Herbert Hoover
The Waldorf-Astoria Towers
New York 22, New York

Dear Chief:

I just now read your letter of December 27th in which you ask me for certain information concerning the deletions from two cables dated July 7th and August 10th, 1944, from President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, excerpts from which appear on pages 66 and 67 of the so-called White Paper. I do not have before me at the moment either of the documents to which you refer. They are encoded documents, not available to Americans but have been supplied generously to Communists and Imperialists. However, I have read both documents frequently and without quoting any encoded documents I can relate to you substantially the contents of the two messages.

¹The above were charged by Hurley and others with being Communists or Communist sympathizers. With Davies, Service, Ludden, and Vincent, who were Foreign Service officers, Hurley carried on a running feud over U. S. policy toward China. When he resigned, Hurley blamed them in part for the failure of American policy in that country. Clarence Gauss was American Ambassador to China 1941-1943. An old China hand with years of experience in the Foreign Service, Gauss had achieved an impeccable record. He grew disenchanted with Chiang Kai-shek and believed his government to be corrupt but he was far from being a "left-winger."

You are fully conversant with the American policy in China up to Pearl Harbor, so I will begin there. The omissions from the quotation of the document on Page 66 of the White Paper do not materially change the import of that document. President Roosevelt was advocating the unification of *ALL* the military forces in China with General Stilwell in command *UNDER GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK*. The President recommended to the Generalissimo that he "recall General Stilwell from Burma and place him directly *UNDER YOU* in command of the Chinese and American forces."

That is it. The Roosevelt military policy for China was to organize all the anti-Japanese military forces in China *UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK*. Note the date of the President's cables. They are dated before I was sent to China as the President's personal representative. This disposes of the charges made against me by the pro-Communist and Imperial propagandists in our State Department that it was I who insisted on giving Chiang Kai-shek the command of the Communist as well as the Nationalist armies of China. The decision was made before the President sent me to China.

Under date of November 26, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said to the Japanese Ambassador: "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support — militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking." That was pre-Pearl Harbor. It was President Roosevelt rather than myself who decided to continue our support of the National Government. He directed me to prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China. It was President Roosevelt rather than myself who decided to support Chiang Kai-shek as the commander of all the military forces in China. I was heartily in favor of the Roosevelt policy and did everything in my power to make it effective.²

The full purport of the President's cable to the Generalissimo dated July 7, 1944 expressed the American policy to recognize only the National Government of the Republic of China, to prevent its collapse and to support Chiang Kai-shek as commander of all the military forces in China. No change was made in the basic American policy in China, so far as I know, until the final surrender of all America's principles and objectives as well as the surrender of the territorial integrity and the political

² Hurley was correct in his account of the originiation of U. S. policy. His charge that State Department officials were pro-Communist and Imperialists is not substantiated.

independence of China made in the secret agreement at Yalta which is dated February 11, 1945. I was opposed to the Yalta secret agreement and insisted that it be made public. You no doubt have a copy of that agreement.¹

The omissions from the President's message to Chiang Kai-shek dated August 10, 1944 appearing on Page 67 of the White Paper do not change the fundamental purport of that message. The omissions from that cable in the White Paper is due, I believe, to the reluctance of the State Department at this time to quote anything from President Roosevelt concerning General Hurley which might be considered commendatory. In that part of the cable which is deleted by the State Department, President Roosevelt told the Generalissimo that General Hurley had broad political and business experience. That he had served actively in the army in the first world war. That he had been Secretary of War and understood the army well. But the part of Roosevelt's message which is now particularly objectionable to the State Department and which is deleted states that: "General Hurley is a well known and respected figure in the public life of this country."

You can readily [*sic*] see that the State Department could not afford to quote such commendatory statements from President Roosevelt in the same document by which it intended to discredit and defame me.

To return to the Roosevelt policy, I repeat I was convinced that President Roosevelt's decision to prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China and to support the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek was correct. After the President had selected me to be his personal military representative in China he discussed in detail the facts upon which he based his policy in China. Very frankly he considered with me the charges of corruption against certain elements in the Chiang Kai-shek government. Roosevelt, like Stalin, believed that there was corruption in the Chinese government but both of them felt that Chiang Kai-shek personally was a "selfless patriot." My purpose on arriving in China was to make the Roosevelt policy effective.

Many public officials and commentators were predicting the immediate collapse of the Chinese government and the surrender of China to Japan. We succeeded in preventing the collapse of the National Government of the Republic and keeping

¹ Evidence in the Hurley papers indicates that he was not as opposed to the Yalta agreement as he would like posterity to believe. Hurley to Truman, May 10, 1946, Hurley Mem., University of Oklahoma.

the Chinese army in the war and also succeeding in upholding the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek until the war was over.

At one time I discussed with Stilwell and later with Roosevelt the possibility in the event of the incapacity or death of Chiang Kai-shek, the support of Mao Tze-tung as the leader in China. Roosevelt was opposed to giving Mao Tze-tung the leadership of China. He did not believe that Mao Tze-tung would cooperate with the United Nations and that he would use our support to promote himself and his own ideology. General Stilwell favored the ousting of Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he was involved in many personal and official controversies. Stilwell at that time was in favor of supporting Li Tsung-jen to succeed Chiang Kai-shek. Roosevelt turned down all of the suggestions and accepted the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek as our best bet for military cooperation and victory over the Japanese.

You now have the basic policy in China up to the period immediately preceding the Yalta conference. For use in that conference, a series of memoranda was prepared for the use of President Roosevelt, copies of which were supplied to me subsequently by the President himself. One of the memoranda states: "There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. toward China. There appear to be elements among the British who, out of imperial considerations, desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period."

This same memorandum warns the President that the Russians may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China or Manchuria. The memorandum concludes as follows: "We recommend that we assume the leadership in assisting China to develop a strong, stable and unified government in order that she may become the principal stabilizing factor in the Far East. We also recommend that we seek British and Russian cooperation to achieve this objective."

Still another of the memoranda furnished the President for use at Yalta states: "There are reports that elements among the British out of imperial considerations desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period." The same document continues: "It is our task to bring about British and Russian support of our objective of a united China which will cooperate with them as well as with us."

All of the documents which I quoted thus far do uphold the

Roosevelt original policy that he outlined for me before my departure for China. Let me now quote from another of the documents supplied the President for his information before Yalta. It is in part as follows:

Ambassador Hurley's attached telegram of December 24 contains information new to the Department in addition to considerable background material. The five points in which the Ambassador (Hurley) outlines his mission are basically sound. With regard to points one and two, it is desirable however to maintain sufficient flexibility in our attitude toward the political scene in China to avoid embarrassment in the unlikely event that Chiang, with his Government is ousted and to take immediate steps to support the elements most likely to carry on resistance.

Of course, we were already taking the precaution suggested. Just for the purpose of keeping the record straight, let me quote here the five points in my report which is referred to as "basically sound" in the above memorandum.

(1) to prevent the collapse of the National Government; (2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies; (3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander; (4) to promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse and (5) to unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.

The memorandum in regard to my December 24 report for the information of the President in his negotiations at Yalta is dated December 26, 1944. This is the first indication I had that the Communist and Imperial sympathizers in the State Department would support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China. I was aware, of course, that we took precautions to support a leader other than Chiang Kai-shek if he should die, be disaffected to our cause or unable to perform. But this memorandum to the President is the first indication I had that we would support what Cordell Hull referred to in his message to Japan of November 26, 1941 as ". . . any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking" or any government in China other than the one President Roosevelt had directed me to sustain.*

Continuing again to quote from the memoranda prepared for President Roosevelt's negotiations at Yalta:

The Ambassador's (Hurley) discussion of the opposition to Chinese unity among foreigners in China (British, French and Dutch diplomats)

* For a good account of the conflict between the State Department officials and Hurley see Robert Smith, "Along in China: Patrick J. Hurley's attempt to unify China, 1944-1945." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1968.

is interesting but it is felt that the conclusions reached are based to some degree on misunderstandings. European diplomats in China are generally more cynical — less optimistic — than Americans are with regard to the prospect of unity in China and their cynicism or pessimism is frequently misinterpreted as opposition to Chinese unity.

That memorandum, of course, is in conflict with another one which I have quoted above. President Roosevelt was fully aware that the Imperialists wanted a diminished, weak, post-war China. The purpose of the Imperialists as related to me directly by their respective ambassadors was to "keep China divided against itself." "Otherwise, a free China will destroy Imperialism in the Orient."

The Imperialists condemned the United States for preventing the collapse of the National Government of China. In fact I reported to President Roosevelt that:

The Imperialist ambassadors had expressed to me the opinions (1) that the Generalissimo has made a deal with Japan; (2) that without such a deal his government would collapse; (3) that the Communists should not unite with the National Government; (4) that the Communists should not permit their troops to be united with the Chinese army and (5) that the United States should deal with the Communist Party and not with the National Government.

That is a part of my report of December 24, referred to above. I recommended that we continue the Roosevelt-Hull traditional American policy.

We come now to a very important document. It is labeled "TOP SECRET" and transmitted in a letter dated February 27, 1945 by Major General John E. Hull, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, to Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China Theater. While the letter is dated February 27, 1945 (which is after the secret agreement at Yalta — February 11, 1945) the letter referred to enclosed for General Wedemeyer's information a memorandum dated January 29, 1945, which appears to have been written in the War Department prior to the Yalta secret agreement and transmitted after the Yalta secret agreement. The document above referred to has some elements in it that indicate that it was intended to be in conflict with the secret agreement made at Yalta.

It is understood that the attitude of the President with regard to Hongkong is as follows: Hongkong should be returned by the British to the Chinese and the Chinese should immediately declare Hongkong a free port under Chinese sovereignty. With regard to possible military operations against Hongkong we have felt that it is undesirable from the political point of view that American forces should be employed for the reoccupation of the island or the adjacent Kowloon leased territory.

This document is important because it seems to disregard Yalta so far as the Imperialists are concerned, but it certainly

changes the American policy which had prevailed in China up to that time. Let me quote from the same document again.

The short-term objective of the United States Government is to assist in mobilizing all of China's human and material resources for prosecution of the war against Japan. We are using our influence to bring about a greater degree of political and military unity, and to achieve greater efficiency and volume in the production of war material. We are supplying China with materials for direct military use and for industrial purposes connected with the war effort. Our long-term objective in China is to assist in the development of a united, democratically progressive, and cooperative China, which will be capable of contributing to security and prosperity in the Far East.

Then after an outline of the military mission, it is stated:

We would like to see the rearmament, to such extent as may be practicable, of *ALL CHINESE FORCES WILLING TO FIGHT THE JAPANESE*, but the present unsatisfactory relations between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists makes it impractic to undertake measures for the rearmament of the Chinese Communists even though it is generally conceded that they could effectively use quantities of small arms, ammunition and demolition materials. *HOWEVER, IF OPERATIONS ARE UNDERTAKEN ALONG THE CHINA COAST IT IS SUGGESTED THAT OUR MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ARM ANY CHINESE FORCES WHICH THEY RELY ON CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED AGAINST THE JAPANESE, AND THAT THEY SHOULD AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME SO ADVISE THE CHINESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.*"

This memorandum further states: "*IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT CHINA SHOULD BE UNIFIED UNDER CHIANG KAI-SHEK.*"

This document was not sent to me. I received it first through a Communist representative of Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Communist Party and the leader of the Communist armed forces, whose headquarters were at Yen-an.

This paper is clearly a departure from the policy outlined in all the documents heretofore quoted to you. It shows an intention to furnish lend-lease arms to the Communist Party without requiring it to submit to our ally, the National Government of the Republic of China. It states clearly a departure from the policy of supporting unification of the armed forces *UNDER* Chiang Kai-shek. How did this memorandum get to the Communists and why was it withheld from me? I do not know, but I do know that John Stewart Service, without my consent or knowledge, was, shortly after the Yalta secret agreement, sent by the State Department to Yen-an. When I found that Service, who was in favor of arming the Communists and who was opposed to the Roosevelt policy in China and who had been relieved as a diplomatic advisor by General Wedemeyer and who had been returned home by me as Ambassador, was sent back to Yen-an without my consent or knowledge. The document last

referred to had been communicated to Mao Tze-tung and others, by whom I do now know, and had not been supplied to me. I was inclined to be a little suspicious concerning what was taking place among the anti-American pro-Communist career men in the State Department. It was then that I requested that I be informed what agreement, if any, had been made at Yalta that was in conflict with the American policy in China.³ I was not given the information at that time.

Now you have the basic outlines of the Roosevelt policy in China. Although Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, had signed with me a five point agreement under which the Communist Armed Party was to be unified with all other anti-Japanese military forces in China under the National Government, that agreement was never accepted by the National Government.

The Roosevelt policy in China was surrendered in secret agreement at Yalta. Roosevelt's policy was attacked and destroyed inside of the American State Department by those who were cooperating with the Communists and the Imperialists for the repeal of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. You will recall that the Atlantic Charter provided that the nations "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other." Russia wanted to expand. In secret agreement at Yalta we agreed to let Communism expand. The Atlantic Charter provided that ". . . they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Both the Imperialists and the Communists wanted this part of the Atlantic Charter destroyed. The Atlantic Charter, as you know, had been approved by 45 nations. The Atlantic Charter was reaffirmed by a resolution I prepared for President Roosevelt at the Conference at Teheran, which is dated December 1, 1943, and contains the following provision: "They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security, and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four governments have subscribed."

The Iran Declaration was the first instrument that was signed in person by Stalin for Russia, Churchill for Britain and Roosevelt for the United States. All of the objectives and principles of the Atlantic Charter were reaffirmed by the Iran Declaration. All of these principles and objectives were surrendered by our diplomats at Yalta. But I am not dealing here with the general surrender of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the parts of the Yalta Agreement which relieved the

³ See Smith, *Ma*, pp. 133-140 and 150-171.

Big 3 or the Big 4 or the Big 5 from application of any of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. I am not treating that part of the Yalta conference here for the reason that I wish to confine this letter to what the Yalta secret agreement did to China. I reiterate, the American policy in China, broadly speaking, was to maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of China. That policy was changed in the secret agreement at Yalta. The agreement was kept secret from the American people, from me as Ambassador to China, from Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic of China and from all the Chinese people. It was well known to the pro-Communists and pro-Imperialists in our government and to the pro-Communists and pro-Imperialists all over the world. The Communists and the Imperialists were jubilant after Yalta. At the beginning I did not know why. I did not obtain any official information on the secret agreement at Yalta until my arrival in Washington in the early part of March, 1945. The State Department told me there was no secret agreement at Yalta. My demand for a copy of any secret agreement was petemptorily refused. At the White House, however, President Roosevelt permitted me to read the document which surrendered the American policy in China to the Communists and the Imperialists. That document is in full as follows:

The leaders of the three Great Powers — The Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain — have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.

(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the prewar interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored.

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company it being understood that the prewar interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence or advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims

of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.
February 11, 1945

This secret document, like the Iran Declaration, was signed in person by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt. I was officially admonished not to comment publicly on the Yalta secret agreement and not to impart it to the Chinese Officials. President Roosevelt was already a sick man at Yalta. He was sick and disturbed when I talked to him in Washington about the Yalta agreement. He seemed unaware of the proportions of the debacle of American diplomacy at Yalta. I talked to him cautiously and kindly about the far reaching effect of the secret agreement. He seemed to become very much interested, and as you know, he dispatched me immediately to London to talk with Prime Minister Churchill about the policy in China and asked me to get the adherence of Britain again to the traditional American policy and to the policy of Hull and Roosevelt, which I have outlined.⁶

In this letter I will not attempt to outline my conversations with Prime Minister Churchill. From London I went to Moscow, also at the direction of President Roosevelt, to discuss the Chinese issues with Stalin. Before I reached Moscow the President had died but the State Department and President Truman directed me to carry on my mission.

Many lies have been told by the pro-Communist and Communist writers about that particular interview with Stalin. Edgar Snow in the *Saturday Evening Post* has said that I nonchalantly asked Stalin on April 15 "what he would settle for in China," and then continued to show my ignorance of the meaning of Stalin's comments. Mr. Snow is not ignorant. He is an astute pro-Communist propagandist. I remonstrated with the Editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, showing him "what Stalin would settle for in China" had been agreed on the previous February 11th in the secret agreement at Yalta. All of Snow's keyhole and under the table information about that conference with Stalin and myself is false and intended only to mislead the prize suckers of the world, the American people. I might say that most of the Americans at that time were "eating up" the *Saturday Evening Post* — Edgar Snow — Communist propaganda. I tried in vain to overcome the effect of the Yalta secret agreement and to

⁶No evidence exists which would indicate that Roosevelt was enfeebled mentally at Yalta.

reinstate the American policy in China. I got permission from Churchill, Anthony Eden and Stalin to restate with their approval the American policy, but I was completely aware that after the death of Roosevelt my chances for reversing Yalta were zero.⁷

After my arrival in Chungking I met the press. I stated that both Britain and Russia had agreed to continue to support the American policy in China, to unify all anti-Japanese military forces under the National Government and under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek; that the three governments, America, Britain and Russia, would support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a unified, independent self government. All of the foregoing principles had been surrendered by the American diplomats in the secret agreement at Yalta. And these same diplomats have attempted to make me appear naive when I attempted to reinstate some of the principles and objectives for which we had told our soldiers we were fighting and for which they were about to win the war. I knew full well after Roosevelt's death that with the pro-Communists and pro-Imperialists in the State Department the cause of China was hopeless.

On my arrival at Chungking it was known that I had conferred with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. The press was anxious to know the results of the conference. They immediately asked me about the agreements at Yalta. Under my instructions I was compelled to tell the press that I could make no comment about the Yalta Conference or any agreements made there. I then told the press that Britain and Russia had both agreed to continue to support the American policy in China, the purpose of which was to unify all the military forces of China under the National Government for the purpose of defeating Japan, and also to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves an independent and united self government. When this statement reached the press the opposition to the government in the British Parliament immediately asked the government representative on the floor of Parliament if the statement made by the American Ambassador in Chungking represented the present British policy toward China. The answer was that the statement made by the American Ambassador on British policy in China was substantially correct.

⁷ Hurley was not trying to reverse Yalta in his conversation with Churchill and later with Stalin. He was simply trying to get renewed commitment on the part of these powers to the American policy in China — that is unification and support of the Chiang government as the government of China.

Notwithstanding this, I was convinced that the Yalta secret agreement would prevail, that without the support of President Roosevelt I could not hope to reinstate the traditional American policy in China.

I sent a dispatch to the State Department outlining what Roosevelt had told me was the American policy toward Imperialism and asked to be advised if that policy had been reversed or modified. I then received from the State Department a message which fully indicated the change of the American policy toward Imperialism in China. I was convinced at that time that the honorable thing for me to do was to resign. I could not bring myself to a conclusion that would enable me to justify forcing us in the terms of the Yalta agreement on China. I was continually compelled by my instructions to say to the press that I had no comment to make concerning the Yalta conference. My position was indeed awkward. After full reflection, however, I decided that I could not during the war attack the war policies agreed upon by the Big Three; to do so might injure the conduct of the war, and I reluctantly brought myself to the decision to continue in office and uphold the Government of China until the close of the war. I might add that being of an enthusiastic disposition I still hoped that the "breaks" might enable me to re-establish at least a part of the American policy in China. But as it turned out from thence forward the "breaks" were all against both me and China because the State Department policy became aggressively pro-Communist, pro-Imperialist and anti-China.

I was in favor of the unification of all the armed forces of China under the National Government and under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. I worked tirelessly to that end. I did get an agreement signed by Mao Tze-tung, the Communist leader, which, as I have said, was rejected by the National Government. But after the close of the war when the policy of my government was to force a civil coalition between the Communists and the Nationalists upon the Republic of China, I dissented again. Mao Tze-tung decided that he would visit Chiang Kai-shek and try to work out with him the basis upon which they both would work for a united government in China. Although Mao Tze-tung and I were in disagreement he, I believe, trusted me completely and notwithstanding all the billingsgats to the contrary, I believe he was truthful with me. At any rate, he requested that I come to Yenan to fly with him in the plane to Chungking. This of course was a mark of his respect for me as well as his confidence in my capacity to give him "safe passage." But you should remember that I had so little interest then in forcing the civilian coalition with the Communists on the Chinese govern-

ment that I left China for the United States while the conferences were in progress. I was not in favor of forcing a peacetime coalition with the Communists on the Nationalist Government unless and until the Communists submitted their military forces to the control of the National Government and accepted the status of a civilian political party operating as a political party and not as an armed belligerent.³

When I arrived in Washington I found the State Department still working for the Communist Armed Party in China against the National Government of the Republic of China with which we had all our treaty relations and which had been our ally in the war. I found that many of my reports to the State Department had been stolen and had been delivered to the Communists through a magazine called AMERASIA; that a man who had been one of my assistants in China had been arrested by the FBI in connection with this donation or sale of state papers to the Communists. The American public was never permitted to see the evidence upon which he was arrested by the FBI. The situation was then, in my opinion, hopeless. The State Department started feeding the *DAILY WORKER* and other pro-Communist papers with distorted excerpts from my reports that were intended to put me in a bad light. It was plain to me that someone in the State Department was also furnishing the information to certain keyhole columnists and to a Communist member of Congress, who were using all the State Department weapons against the American system of self government and in favor of collectivism and Communism. Throughout this time I was directed not to make public any facts pertaining to the secret agreement at Yalta or the reversal of the American policy in China, but the pro-Communists in the State Department and the Communist member of Congress and all the Communist and pro-Communist newspapers were being fed distorted accounts and falsehoods concerning what I had done in China.

At that time I decided that I must resign. I should tell you that President Truman told me that he would give me his wholehearted support and that he would remove from positions in the State Department those who were opposing and sabotaging my work in China. I would be less than truthful if I did not tell you that I was then convinced and I now believe that President Truman meant what he said to me. Notwithstanding this assurance from the President, matters occurred that same day that convinced me that the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, was

³ See Smith Ms. for a good account of this phase of Hurley's diplomacy.

engaged in an attempt to whitewash all of those in the State Department who had been supplying information to the Communists and who were engaged in sabotaging individual liberty and self government in favor of collectivism and Communism. I was physically unwell. I was convinced that the Government through the State Department was working against China, against the American policy and against me, notwithstanding the position that had been taken by President Truman.

Since my resignation I have not explained to President Truman that I did not distrust him, but I want you to know that I did not and do not distrust him. I have thought at times that he has been misled. In the condition of my health I had no heart to take on a fight concerning a conflict that in my opinion existed between Byrnes and Truman in addition to the Chinese situation. That was my frame of mind the day I resigned.

I thought that my resignation and accompanying statement would bring the American people to a realization of what was taking place. Much to my regret I found that the public generally was not interested. Nearly all of the publicity was the tax-supported propaganda of my own government together with the propaganda of the Communists and the Imperialists, all of which made the efforts of an individual fighting for American principles hopeless.

Now I leave the discussion of the American policy in China to answer one of the questions contained in your letter. You ask if I believed Stalin and Molotov when they told me that the Chinese Communists were not in fact Communists. The answer is yes. I believed them because what they said supported the information that I had obtained in China while traveling in the Communist controlled areas. As you know, probably 75% of the Chinese people are a little above beasts of burden for the other 25%. The upper 25% are land owners, merchants, bankers, etc. Unquestionably the Communist leaders in China are Communists. But at least 75% of the population of China have no idea of what Communism really is. They are not Communists. The merchants, land owners, business men and bankers are not Communists. In the Communist areas I found all of the stores open. I found private business flourishing. The cattle, hog and sheep markets were open. People were selling at the highest prices they could obtain and buying at the lowest price available. Private enterprise, private competition was being freely exercised in the Communist areas. The people were not Communists. The people were hungry and desired reforms. The Communists offered them food and better conditions. The peo-

ple knew that during the revolution, and by the way revolution is continuous in China where the people are nearly always hungry, and during the war against Japan, the Nationalist Government had been unable to better the conditions of the people and make the reforms which they had promised. All of this made the people enthusiastic in support of the promise of food and reformation offered by the Communists. It is true that many people in the Communist area told me that they were in favor of Communism that would give the food and the reformation that the people so desired. But these people were not real Communists. They did not even understand what Communism is, and Molotov was correct when he said that they are "oleo-margarine Communists." Those who are saying that the Chinese are real Communists are overlooking the difference between the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist leaders. Now that China is in the hands of the Communists, the iron curtain will prevent the world from seeing the rude awakening that will come to the Chinese people who have followed the Chinese Communist Party when they learn that Communism is not what they believed they were supporting.

The American policy after my resignation as Ambassador was deliberately aimed to destroy the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek who is the only leader of great stature in China who is a Christian and is unalterably anti-Communist. The policy was further intended to bring about the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China and to establish instead the present regime. The Yalta secret agreement was the State Department's blueprint for the Communist conquest of China.

I would not have you believe, my friend, that I am taking all of the attacks made upon me during the last five years too seriously. The White Paper, the Communist and the Imperialist propagandists have not been able to make me regret the *MISTAKES I DID NOT MAKE IN CHINA*.

Sincerely yours,
Patrick J. Hurley