

COLONEL W. B. HAZEN IN THE INDIAN TERRITORY
1868-1869*By Marvin Krocker**

INTRODUCTION

William Babcock Hazen (1830-1887) was a part of the great drama of the frontier movement into the Trans-Mississippi West. Twenty years of his life were spent as an army officer on the western frontier. Following his graduation from West Point in 1855 he saw service with the 4th U.S. Infantry, fighting Indians in Oregon, Texas, and New Mexico. In 1859 he was seriously wounded in a battle with the Comanches in Texas.

Hazen rendered distinctive service in the Civil War as a commanding officer of the Ohio Volunteers. He saw extensive action in major campaigns commanded by Braxton Bragg, William Rosecrans, and William T. Sherman. After receiving several citations for his meritorious achievements on various battle fields of the Civil War, he rose to the rank of brevet major general. In 1866, with the reorganization of the regular army, Hazen was made Colonel of the 38th Infantry and transferred to the West.

His tours of duty during a period of almost fourteen years took him throughout the entire Great Plains and much of the Rocky Mountains. He commanded several frontier army posts and fulfilled various special military assignments in Indian Territory and elsewhere. In 1872 he exposed the Army trading post corruption at Fort Sill that eventually implicated Secretary of War William Belknap. He wrote several influential and controversial articles on the Great Plains and also a history of his own military career in the Civil War. In 1880 Hazen was appointed Chief Signal Officer in the War Department, with a rank of brigadier general, holding this position until his death in 1887.¹

Thus far no complete study has been made of the long and varied career of this important frontier figure. Through an ex-

* Marvin E. Krocker is a member of the history staff at Tabor College, Hillsboro, Kansas. He is at present on leave of absence to pursue studies leading to a doctorate in history at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.—Ed.

¹ For brief sketches of the career of W. B. Hazen see Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, I (Washington, 1903); Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds. *Dictionary of American Biography*, VII (New York, 1946); *New York Tribune*, January 17, 1897; Carolyn Thomas Foreman, "General William Babcock Hazen," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, XX (December, 1942). For Hazen's Civil War career see W. B. Hazen, *A Narrative of Military Service* (Boston, 1845).

tended period of personal contact and close study Hazen gained a knowledge of the plains region and the Plains Indian surpassed by few other white men of his time. He developed keen insights and fixed beliefs about the future of the Great Plains, consistently advocating and upholding the closed reservation as the solution to the Indian problem. When the reservation system was adopted after the Civil War, Hazen was asked to participate in its implementation. Extensive coercion was necessary to get the Southern Plains tribes, Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa-Apache, Cheyenne and Arapaho, to forsake their vast open ranges for restricted reserves in present-day Oklahoma. The winter campaign of 1868-1869 occurred in this context. The exploits, real or fancied, of Philip Sheridan and George Custer are well known to students of the Trans-Mississippi West. Often overlooked or confused in one other aspect of the policy toward the Indians in 1868-1869, namely, to look after the peaceful bands, and prevent their joining the hostiles. Colonel Hazen was specially appointed to carry out these objectives. This paper seeks to clarify Hazen's role in placing the Kiowa, Comanche, and other tribes on their reservations and to describe his activities as a special agent in Indian Territory in 1868-1869.

COLONEL HAZEN: SPECIAL MILITARY AGENT AT FORT COBB
1868-1869

The advance of the western frontier by the time of the Civil War created a serious problem with the Southern Plains Indians. The migrations of miners and settlers into their homeland inaugurated over a decade of almost constant Indian warfare in the Great West. The Colorado gold rush of 1859 provided a foretaste of the movement into this area. Few of the 50,000 goldseekers struck it rich; many, however, spilled across the Cheyenne and Arapaho lands after 1859 and established permanent residence. The government officials in 1861 sought to avert a general uprising in Colorado by removing the Indians to a reservation situated primarily between the Arkansas River and Sand Creek in eastern Colorado. Since many of the warriors resented this decision, Indian depredations in the following years increased in number as well as in intensity. Isolated settlements were attacked, horses stolen, immigrants harassed, and overland trade and mail routes generally disrupted.¹⁾

In 1864 Governor John Evans and the Colorado officials decided to take things into their own hands in an effort to quell the Indian resistance. Their efforts culminated in the "Chivington Massacre" on the morning of November 29, 1864. Black Kettle, who claimed to be resting under the protection of the

¹⁾ Ray Allen Billington, *Westward Expansion* (New York, 1859), pp. 654-655.

military, was among those who luckily escaped annihilation in this surprise attack on the sleeping Cheyenne village. The Sand Creek disaster solved nothing. Indeed, it only served to intensify the bloody fighting which came to be called the Cheyenne-Arapaho War.²

In an effort to pacify the hostiles, the Federal government in October, 1865, met for peace talks with representatives of various hostile plains tribes. The negotiations were conducted six miles above the confluence of the Big and Little Arkansas Rivers, on the northwestern outskirts of present-day Wichita, Kansas. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes agreed to make peace with the United States and accept a more out-of-the-way reservation, located partly in Kansas and partly in Indian Territory.³ The Kiowa, Comanche and Kiowa-Apache tribes gave up claims to central Texas, western Kansas, and eastern New Mexico, receiving in exchange hunting rights to areas of what is now the Texas Panhandle, and that part of southwestern Oklahoma south of the Canadian.⁴

Misunderstandings, dissatisfaction and delays in Congressional ratification made adherence to the Treaty of the Little Arkansas an impossibility. The government, in making treaties, acted upon a legal fiction that the Indian signators had the authority to bind, yet the various chiefs often had little control over their people. After nearly every treaty there were bands or chiefs who maintained that they had not been included. Nevertheless, the government took the position that all terms should be faithfully kept by all members of a given tribe once a supposed leader of such tribe had affixed his mark. It also proceeded to immediately use its specified rights to open roads or lands to white settlers.⁵

Following the Sand Creek Massacre pressure mounted on Congress to reevaluate the philosophy and conduct of the existing Indian policy. On March 3, 1865, Congress appointed a commission composed of seven of its own members "to inquire into the condition of the Indian tribes, and their treatment by the civil and military authorities."⁶ The committee's report issued in 1867, presented evidence that "much inefficiency and corrupt practice were to be found in almost every branch of the Indian service." Also much of the blame for the hostilities of the past

² *Ibid.*, 857; Donald J. Berthrong, *The Southern Cheyenne* (Norman, 1963), p. 223.

³ Charles J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties*, Vol. II (Washington, 1904), p. 893.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 887.

⁵ George E. Hyde, *Red Cloud's Folk* (Norman, 1937), p. 137.

⁶ Frederick L. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier* (New York, 1914), p. 287.

and present was placed on the "fire and sword" policy of the military.⁷

The committee's report was widely publicized in the East and led to strong demands for a new and more humanitarian approach to the Indian problem. Congress reacted to this pressure by passing an act on July 20, 1867, which created an Indian Peace Commission. The Peace Commission was to remove the causes of Indian wars, provide just settlement of grievances, and induce the Indians to settle down on restricted reservations. The accomplishment of this, it was hoped, would bring permanent peace to the frontier, acculturate the Indian, and permit the unimpeded development of the West. If the Indians accepted neither the reservation system nor peace offered by the commissioners, then the act authorized the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, to take military steps to suppress hostilities.⁸

In August, 1867, the Peace Commission journeyed to the West, olive branch in hand, to carry out its lofty assignment. Two large reservations were envisioned for the Indians: one in the Dakota country, for the Sioux and other bands, and the other in Indian Territory, which was proposed as a home for the Southern Plains tribes.⁹

By October the commissioners had arranged for a great Indian peace council to be held on Medicine Lodge Creek in present Barber County, Kansas. After much ceremony, discussion, disputation and consumption of government food, treaties were signed with representatives of the major tribes south of the Arkansas. On October 21, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache agreed to relinquish the whole of their ranges in the panhandles of Texas and Indian Territory, and accept a reservation in southwestern Indian Territory between the Red River and the Washita.¹⁰ A week later the Cheyennes and Arapahoes agreed to move to a reservation largely in the Cherokee Outlet, between the Arkansas and Cimarron Rivers. All five tribes swore to give up their nomadic ways, and in general seek to "walk the white man's road." The government in turn promised to provide agents, schools, churches, farms, clothing and food, until the Indians would at last be adjusted to a sedentary way of life. The Cheyenne and Arapaho desire for unlimited hunting ranges was not met but the government did give permission to hunt as

⁷ *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1867*, p. 2. (Hereafter cited as *Report*).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4; *United States Statutes at Large*, Vol. XV, p. 17.

⁹ William Tecumseh Sherman, *Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman*, Vol. II (New York, 1882), p. 435.

¹⁰ Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties*, Vol. II, pp. 979-976, 983.

far north as the Arkansas River. The tribes pledged to refrain from making forays against any travelers or settlements, and to "never kill or scalp white men, nor attempt to do them any harm."¹¹

The treaties of Medicine Lodge Creek were not ratified by the Senate until July, 1868, and not proclaimed until August of that year. The delay in the appropriation of funds to put the treaties into effect caused destitution among the Indians, and retarded the work of the Indian agents. Also, during the interim period, whites entered parts of the old reservations and began to make settlements. No effort was made to check this trespass. Thus the Indians were pushed out of their ranges before any provisions were made to care for them on their new reservations. Suspicion, anger, and a return to violence was the result.¹² Thus less than a year after the treaties of Medicine Lodge, war parties were out in force once again.

When Congress failed to act promptly on the Medicine Lodge treaties, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs repeatedly requested appropriations to adequately provide for the Indians in the interim period. Many Republicans, however, were too pre-occupied with efforts to "lift the scalp" of President Andrew Johnson to worry about scalplings farther west. Some of the Indians wandered to their newly assigned reservations but, finding no agents present, migrated back to the Arkansas River area. Distributions of annuities were made from time to time at Forts Larned and Zarah. N. C. Taylor's third appeal for money was finally met, in part, on July 27, 1868. By an act of Congress, a sum of \$500,000 was appropriated for "carrying out the treaty stipulations, making and preparing homes, furnishing provisions, tools and farming utensils, and furnishing food for such bands of Indians with which treaties have been made by the Indian peace commissioners and not yet ratified, and defraying the expenses of the commission in making such treaties, and carrying their provisions into effect . . ." This money was appropriated to the Department of Interior but General William T. Sherman, in command of the Division of the Missouri, was designated to expend the funds.¹³

Sherman, when informed of the act of July 27, telegraphed the Secretary of Interior, O. H. Browning, for a clarification of the new duties thrust upon him. He was concerned that the law would lead to conflicts with the Indian Bureau which was already

¹¹ *ibid.*, 984-985; Berthrong, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

¹² George W. Manypenny, *Our Indian Wars* (Cincinnati, 1883), p. 204.

¹³ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. XV, p. 222.

performing similar duties through its agents.¹⁴ Browning informed Sherman that the intent of the law was to provide for special agents who would assist in the big task of getting the Indians moved on their reservations and started along the road to civilization. Sherman was at liberty to select either civilians or soldiers as the agents. He was, furthermore, empowered to assign the agents their specific duties. Browning stated that the regular Indian agents would continue their work as heretofore, "but without, in any manner, interfering with you in the performance of your duties." They would be instructed to cooperate fully "to such extent as you may desire and ask their cooperation"¹⁵

On August 10, 1868, Sherman issued General Order Number Four to implement the act of July 27. Two large Indian military districts were designated and special "commanders" were appointed to serve over each. The Northern District, embracing the area west of the Missouri River, within the Sioux reservation, was put under the command of Brevet Major General W. S. Harney. The Southern Indian Military District comprised an area "bounded on the east by the state of Arkansas, south by Texas, north by Kansas, and west by the 100th meridian." Brevet Major General William B. Hazen was selected to head this district and "have the supervision and control of all issues and disbursements (to the) Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches, and such other bands as are now or may hereafter be therein located by proper authority." \$50,000 was set aside for his use in providing for the Indians in this district. The order made Hazen responsible only to General Sherman except in matters "affecting the troops stationed in said district" wherein he would be subject to the commander of the Department of the Missouri, Major General Philip H. Sheridan.¹⁶

The officers assigned by Sherman were to serve until June 30, 1869, after which they would return to their regular army duties. Sherman's decision to appoint army officers as his special agents, rather than experienced civilian agents already in the Indian service, was based on two considerations. In the first place, he was more familiar with the army form of accounts; secondly, as he frankly stated, he had "more faith in their manner of business."¹⁷

Hazen, on duty with the 38th Infantry, received on September 2, 1868, official notification of his appointment. Subsequently he learned that Sherman and Sheridan had agreed on an extensive punitive winter campaign to drive the Southern

¹⁴ O. H. Browning to W. T. Sherman, August 6, 1868, in *Report*, 1868, p. 82.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁶ General Orders No. 4 in *ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁷ Sherman to Browning, August 11, 1868, in *ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

Plains Indians to the reservations assigned at Medicine Lodge. As early as August 21, 1868, Sherman informed the War and Interior Departments that he had authorized Sheridan to use military force to move the Indians south, killing if necessary. The Indian Bureau, however, demanded assurances that peaceful tribes would be granted protection. The Kiowas, Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches, according to Central Superintendent Thomas Murphy, "have committed no depredations since they signed their treaty at Medicine Lodge creek, except for a few raids into Texas." These tribes, it was contended, should not be made to suffer at the hands of the military just because of the war activities of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes.¹⁴ Sherman was willing to concede that the peaceful tribes deserved safety and fair treatment. But as for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, he believed that ". . . no better time could possibly be chosen than the present for destroying or humbling those bands that have so outrageously violated their treaties and begun a desolating war without one particle of provocation . . ."¹⁵

Hazen's first assignment in his role as special agent was to assist in separating the peaceful tribes from the declared hostiles. In early September he was sent by Sherman to assemble the Kiowa and Comanche bands at Fort Larned, Kansas.¹⁶ Portions of these tribes, in June, 1868, had left their reservation south of the Washita River in Indian Territory. Since then they had been camped along the Arkansas in the Big Bend country.¹⁷ Together with some Kiowa-Apaches there were approximately nineteen hundred Indians in the vicinity of Fort Larned who claimed to be friendly.¹⁸

On September 18, Hazen and Sheridan conferred at Fort Larned on means to isolate the friendly Indians in order that the unfriendly could be dealt with in the proposed frontier army manner. It was agreed that a council with the peaceful tribes should be held to warn them that unless they moved to their reservation, they, too, would be attacked by the troops. Sheridan agreed to furnish rations for their journey to Indian Territory and Hazen agreed to accompany them. Old Fort Cobb, near the confluence of Pond Creek (later called Cobb Creek) and the Washita River, was designated as the site for Hazen's headquarters and the rendezvous for the peaceful Indians. September

¹⁴ Thomas Murphy to Charles E. Mix, September 19, 1868, in *ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁵ Sherman to J. M. Schotfield, September 17, 1868, in *ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁶ *Annual Report for the Secretary of War for the Year 1868*, p. 4.

¹⁷ P. H. Sheridan to W. B. Hazen, September 19, 1868, in W. B. Hazen, "Some Corrections of Life on the Plains," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, III (December, 1925), p. 300. (Hereafter cited as "Some Corrections").

¹⁸ Hazen to Sherman, June 20, 1868, in *Report, 1868*, p. 306.

19 and 20 were spent in council with all the principal Kiowa chiefs and Ten Bears of the Comanches. Hazen assured them that their only possibility of safety was to accompany him to Fort Cobb and remain there under his protection. The chiefs at first balked, but finally consented to go.²¹ Sheridan later maintained that the chiefs accepted the proposition "only as a decoy to get their families out of the proximity of the post."²²

Since it required about ten days to get the rations ready for the long journey, the Indians were told to hunt buffalo during that time. After ten days they were to return for their rations and then proceed to Fort Cobb. Shortly after their departure a flurry of Indian raids occurred along the Smoky Hill and elsewhere. When the Kiowas and Comanches failed to return at the stipulated time, Sheridan assumed they had joined the raiding Cheyennes and Arapahoes, but Hazen found "no evidence of that fact."²³ Hazen reasoned that the Indians, knowing they were under suspicion, would proceed directly to the reservation on their own. Thomas Murphy agreed with this latter view.²⁴ Waiting until October 11 for the return of his Indians, Hazen then decided to set out for Fort Cobb, on the assumption that the tribes would meet him there. Since there were not enough troops available to provide him with an escort he decided to skirt the Indian country by proceeding via Forts Smith, Gibson, and Arbuckle.²⁵ Prior to his departure, Hazen instructed Major James Roy at Fort Arbuckle to assign an officer to supervise affairs at Fort Cobb until he could arrive. Captain Henry E. Alvord, 10th Cavalry, was dispatched to the fort in response to this request. He was accompanied by two companies of troops from the 10th Cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Philip L. Lee.²⁶

Also in October, Commissioner Taylor ordered agents A. G. Boone and Edward W. Wynkoop "to repair without delay" to Fort Cobb to assist Hazen in caring for the Indians who might choose to gather there.²⁷ Wynkoop, the Cheyenne and Arapaho agent, did not trust Sheridan nor his troops. He feared that he was being used as "a decoy to lure Indians into a trap at or

²¹ Hazen, "Some Corrections," pp. 300-301; Hazen to Sherman, November 10, 1868, *The Sherman-Sheridan Papers* (University of Oklahoma Transcripts). (Hereafter cited as S-S Papers.)

²² Sheridan to Sherman, October 15, 1868, *The Sheridan Papers*; For a study of the establishment and important events associated with the early history of Fort Cobb see Muriel H. Wright, "A History of Fort Cobb," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, Vol. XXXIV (Spring, 1956), p. 62.

²³ Hazen to Sherman, November 10, 1868, S-S Papers.

²⁴ Report, 1868, p. 258.

²⁵ Hazen to Sherman, June 30, 1869, in *ibid.*, 1869, p. 388.

²⁶ Captain Henry E. Alvord to Hazen, October 30, 1868, S-S Papers.

²⁷ Report, 1868, p. 256.

near Fort Cobb." Rather than becoming an "accessory" to such a "crime," he resigned as agent.¹⁰

While Hazen was on his roundabout journey to Fort Cobb, Captain Alvord, his "stand in" was busily occupied. Several hundred Indians were already in the vicinity when Alvord arrived at the fort. Before the end of October, the chiefs Hazen had met at Fort Larned reported to the post, thus fulfilling his trust in them. The Indians told Alvord they had not returned to Fort Larned because they feared some trick and because they did not particularly like to travel with soldiers. Since neither Hazen nor the promised supplies had arrived, the chiefs decided to hunt on the Canadian in the region of the Antelope Hills. They promised to return as soon as Hazen made his appearance but gave the opinion that they did not really expect him to arrive.¹¹ On October 31, Alvord held council with representatives of the Caddoes, Anadarkoes, Wichitas, Wacos, Keechies, Towacaroos, and three Comanche bands. He sought to assure these Indians that Hazen and their promised food supplies would arrive shortly. The Comanche bands were especially restless. They threatened daily to break camp and return to their old ranges unless their needs were supplied.¹²

Captain Alvord had few subsistence stores at his disposal. It had been assumed that Hazen would arrive much sooner than he did and so adequate provisions had not been made. As early as September 25 the commanding officers at Fort Arbuckle reported they "were expecting Hazen daily." S. T. Walkley, acting agent of the Kiowas and Comanches, had used this "information" for nearly a month in an effort to induce his Indians to remain near the agency.¹³ Henry Shanklin, the harassed agent of the Wichita and affiliated tribes, also anxiously looked for Hazen's arrival. Shanklin finally left the agency on October 11 because he thought Hazen would soon be there and could take care of his disgruntled charges for him.¹⁴ On November 5, Alvord reported that the situation at Fort Cobb was precarious. He could no longer placate the Indians with only beef, and his supplies of flour, sugar and coffee were nearly exhausted. He had on hand only one-half a barrel of coffee and 170 barrels of flour to be distributed among some 1,700 Indians. The troubled officer was convinced that without additional stores he would

¹⁰ Edward W. Wynkoop to Peter Cooper and others, December 23, 1868. *The Sheridan Papers; New York Tribune*, December 24, 1868.

¹¹ Alvord to Major James P. Roy, October 30, 1868. *S-S Papers*.

¹² Alvord to Roy, November 5, 1868. *Ibid.*

¹³ Captain J. B. Rife to S. T. Walkley, September 25, 1868. Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81 MSS, Central Superintendency, Kiowa Agency, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Bizzell Library, Norman, Oklahoma.

¹⁴ Henry Shanklin to Hazen, October 11, 1868. *S-S Papers*.

be unable to keep the Comanches at the fort.¹¹ Two days after this gloomy report Hazen finally arrived via Fort Arbuckle, accompanied by a squadron of cavalry and a company of infantry.¹²

Hazen immediately launched into his work. In a briefing session with Alvord he learned that there were around seven hundred Comanches near the fort and approximately one thousand Caddoes, Wichitas and affiliated Indians. Alvord, through diligent effort, had been able to ascertain the locations and note the movements of the various bands throughout the entire area. Colonel Hazen was pleased that the Kiowa and Comanche bands with whom he had held council had indeed reported to the post. These bands were still camped in the Antelope Hills region. Hazen, therefore, on the first day of his arrival dispatched scouts to notify them of his presence and to tell them to proceed to the fort. He feared that Sheridan's forces might encounter and attack the bands since he knew that the general was under the impression that they had broken faith. He also sent reports to Sheridan informing him of the status of those bands.¹³ One day spent examining the situation at Fort Cobb was sufficient to impress upon Hazen the magnitude of the task which lay before him. Thousands of Indians surrounded the fort looking to him for subsistence and direction. No Indian Bureau agents were present to lend him assistance. Instead of having only Kiowas and Comanches as his charges, as he originally anticipated, he had bands of many other tribes on his hands. This heavy responsibility prompted him to inform General Sherman on November 7 that his duties would now "preclude . . . taking an active command, as before requested."¹⁴

News of Hazen's arrival spread rapidly to the various encampments along the Washita and Canadian rivers. Delegations from many different bands came in to see what arrangements were to be made for them. However, the Kiowas and the Yamparika Comanches, camped on the upper Washita and on the Canadian near the 100th meridian, were more hesitant. They had been warned by a trusted interpreter, John Smith, not to fall into the trap set for them at Fort Cobb.¹⁵ The scouts sent out to warn the Kiowas and Ten Bear's band of Comanches had not reported back by November 10. This caused Hazen to again officially express concern that Sheridan might attack these bands before he could collect them.¹⁶ A report a few days later indicated that a major portion of the Kiowas were moving down the

¹¹ Alvord to Roy, November 5, 1868, *ibid.*

¹² Charles J. Brill, *Conquest of the Southern Plains* (Oklahoma City, 1938), p. 131; Hazen to Sherman, November 7, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Hazen to Sherman, June 30, 1869, in *Report, 1869*, p. 358.

¹⁴ Hazen to Sherman, November 7, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

¹⁵ Hazen to Sherman, November 19, 1868, *ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Washita.⁴¹ By November 20, the principal chiefs, including Lone Wolf, Satanta, and Satank, had come to confer with Hazen. Acting under Sherman's instructions of October 13 to "make provision for all the Indians who come to keep out of war," Hazen issued rations to the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches with the understanding that they were to camp peacefully near the agency.⁴²

Hazen considered the Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes beyond his sphere of authority since they had officially been declared hostile by Sherman and Sheridan.⁴³ Thus when Black Kettle and Big Mouth, representing several Cheyenne and Arapaho bands, sued for peace on November 20, Hazen turned them away. This despite the fact that they had come in on their own accord and seemed sincerely desirous of settling down near the agency. The officer reasoned that he could not shelter Indians against whom war was then being waged. He told Black Kettle that only Sheridan could make peace with him because he represented a portion of the tribe that had started the war in Kansas. Black Kettle was urged to return to his camps on the upper Washita, to contact Sheridan and express his desire for peace. If peace were made from that quarter then Hazen said he would be happy to provide for his band at Fort Cobb; but they were not to come in unless they heard from him.⁴⁴ Disappointed in their quest for protection and supplies, Black Kettle and Big Mouth prepared to return to their people. Before leaving, however, they secured some food and other goods from a trader at the fort named "Dutch" Bill Griffenatein.⁴⁵ As the Cheyenne and Arapaho delegation departed the agency, some of the young warriors were heard to express pleasure that the peace talks had failed. They boasted that they would now be able to continue their raids, and that in the following spring they planned to join other bands to "clear out this entire country."⁴⁶

Hazen's conference with Black Kettle and Big Mouth was fully discussed in his lengthy November 22nd report. Hazen explained that he feared that if he made peace with the chiefs Sheridan "might follow them in afterwards and a second Chivington affair might occur." Such an assumption was plausible because Sherman had written Hazen that it might be necessary for General Sheridan "to invade the reservation in pursuit of

⁴¹ Hazen to Sherman, November 22, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

⁴² Hazen, "Some Corrections," pp. 302-303.

⁴³ Hazen to Sherman, November 19, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

⁴⁴ Hazen to Sherman, November 22, 1868, *ibid.*

⁴⁵ Sheridan to Brevet Major General W. A. Nichols, Assistant Adjutant General, December 24, 1868, *Sheridan Papers*.

⁴⁶ Hazen to Sherman, November 22, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

hostile Indians."⁴⁷ Hazen suggested that it might be advantageous for Sheridan to make peace with the "distinct bands" of Black Kettle and Big Mouth. Even though they apparently did not represent or control a majority of their tribes, their submission would weaken the enemy forces out in the field. Colonel Hazen believed he had dealt with the chiefs according to military policy and the general instructions given him previously. Nevertheless, he requested Sherman to give him "definite instructions in this and like cases."⁴⁸ But this "case" was closed five days later when Custer wiped out Black Kettle and many of his band.

Black Kettle's death at the Battle of Washita on November 27, 1868, led to a new wave of criticism against the military handling of the Plains Indians. Representatives of the Indian Bureau, former agent Wynkoop, and others decried a policy that led to the slaughter of a prominent chief who they claimed was earnestly striving for peace. Sherman sought to defend the army's role by proving that Black Kettle's camp was not friendly and that Custer was not another Chivington. Chivington had attacked Black Kettle when the latter was under the protection of the commanding officer at Fort Lyon. Sherman had documentation to show that in the Washita battle the chief had explicitly been refused protection until he made peace with Sheridan.⁴⁹ Hazen was quick to defend himself and his fellow army officers. In a letter to Sherman, December 31, 1868, the special agent said he wished to refute the statements "that Black Kettle's camp, destroyed by Custer, were peaceable Indians on their way to their Reservation. In his talk with me . . . before he was killed, Black Kettle stated that many of his men were then on the war path, and that their people did not want peace with the people above the Arkansas."⁵⁰ The emphasis in this letter was in contrast to Hazen's earlier report in which he professed belief that Black Kettle was sincere for "peace," and even suggested that Sheridan make peace with his "distinct" band.

The procurement and distribution of food was one of the major duties incident to the work in the Southern Indian District. The \$50,000 allotted for Indian services in the area was not originally intended for Indian subsistence. The failure of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds for that purpose forced Hazen to spend most of his money on food. Furthermore, he had been informed that regular agency personnel would be available to assist him in caring for the Indians.⁵¹ But Jesse Henry

⁴⁷ Sherman to Hazen, October 13, 1868, in Hazen, "Some Corrections," p. 349.

⁴⁸ Hazen to Sherman, November 22, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

⁴⁹ Berthrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232.

⁵⁰ Hazen to Sherman, December 31, 1868, *Sheridan Papers*.

⁵¹ Hazen to Sherman, June 20, 1869, in *Report, 1869*, p. 389.

Leavenworth, Kiowa-Comanche agent, and his temporary successor, S. T. Walkley, had left Fort Cobb prior to Hazen's arrival. Henry Shanklin never returned from his sudden "leave of absence"; instead, on January 9, 1869, he resigned as agent of the Wichita and affiliated tribes because of a "severe affliction of rheumatism contracted in Indian Territory."¹² The only agent ever to show up at Fort Cobb during Colonel Hazen's eight-month tenure was A. G. Boone, the newly appointed Kiowa-Comanche agent, who arrived in December, 1868. Despite repeated requests for more funds Hazen was unable to get any additional aid from either Congress, the Indian Bureau, or the army.¹³

Hazen estimated that he would need to provide rations for approximately eight thousand Indians at a total cost, for a six month period, of \$115,220. In addition his itemized budget called for the hiring of two clerks, one storekeeper, one interpreter, four scouts, one butcher, one teamster, roofing an old store-house, and other miscellaneous expenses. His total budget, as submitted on November 10, amounted to \$127,700.¹⁴

Through a process of trial and experimentation a standard fixed ration system was gradually instituted. Arrangements were made to secure beef in the area at three cents per pound net. This was about one-half the price agents Leavenworth and Walkley had paid for beef.¹⁵ The ration system was based on the following formula for each 100 rations: 150 pounds of beef, seventy-five pounds of corn meal, twenty-five pounds of flour, four pounds of sugar, two pounds of coffee, one pound of soap, and one pound of salt. In mid-winter the beef allowance was increased to 250 pounds per 100 rations. Rations were issued on a weekly or ten day basis. They were distributed to the chiefs of each band according to the actual number of their followers present at the place of disbursement. Previously, by exaggerating their numbers, the chiefs had been able to secure much more liberal food allowances. The practice of issuing rations based on actual count did not set well with the chiefs. Hazen reported that they were "always disappointed, usually angry, and always giving

¹² *Ibid.*, 394; Henry Shanklin to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 9, 1869. Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81 MSS, Central Superintendency, Wichita Agency, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Microcopy 234, Roll No. 928.

¹³ Hazen to Sherman, June 20, 1868, in *Report, 1868*, p. 295.

¹⁴ Hazen to Sherman, November 10, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* An investigation later revealed that Walkley had participated in a scheme whereby he encouraged the Caddoes to steal Texas cattle which he then purchased for five cents per head. The agent then sold the cattle for nine cents a pound to be used for Indian rations. A. G. Boone to N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 20, 1869, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81 MSS, Central Superintendency, Kiowa Agency, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Microcopy 234, Roll 378.

annoyance, which had to be endured at the risk of revolt."⁵⁴ Through careful checking and observation Hazen concluded that the population of Indians at the time of his arrival had been rated "at fully double their real numbers."⁵⁵ Sugar and coffee, according to official instructions, were to be issued only occasionally and sparingly. But because of pressure and agitation previous agents had diverted much of the ration money into those two commodities. Hazen found it "almost impossible to correct the abuse." He ultimately capitulated and agreed that they should form a part of the regular allowance.⁵⁶

A food distribution program was fraught with many perils. The red men, used to an ample supply of buffalo meat, complained bitterly about the scanty portions of beef they received and they universally detested corn meal. The dissatisfaction over the food situation became so intense that Hazen, on November 26, requested that additional troops be sent from Fort Arbuckle. He also asked that two howitzers with 100 rounds of ammunition be provided for him. This call for reinforcements was prompted by the surly attitude of a group of Kiowas and Apaches who, upon receiving their rations, grumbled menacingly because "they could not have everything there is at the Post."⁵⁷ Satanta was one of those complaining. He and the other agitators moved among the various camps threatening serious trouble before going on to their own lodges, thirty miles up the Washita.⁵⁸ Fortunately for Hazen, the garrison was temporarily strengthened and also the approach of Sheridan's forces helped pacify the Indians. Otherwise, Hazen said he would not have remained at Fort Cobb.⁵⁹ By June 30, 1869, Hazen had spent \$41,250 for food out of his funds. In addition he had purchased, apparently on his own authority, \$56,106.86 worth of commodities for the government on credit. The Secretary of Interior agreed in May, 1869, to honor the bill.⁶¹

The extensive military operations in western Indian Territory through the winter of 1868-1869 kept the Indians near Fort Cobb in a constant state of restlessness and anxiety. When reports of the Battle of Washita were first received, it was feared that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes might attack the fort in

⁵⁴ Hazen to Sherman, June 30, 1869, *Report*, 449, p. 300.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 383-390. Hazen's own estimate, which he admitted was subject to error, placed the number of Indians in the area on June 30, 1869, at about 7,000. This figure included the following tribes, both on and off the reservation: Comanche, Kiowa, Apache, Caddo, Wichita and affiliated bands, Arapaho, and Cheyenne. *Ibid.*, pp. 303-304.

⁵⁶ Hazen to Sherman, November 23, 1868, *S-S Papers*.

⁵⁷ Hazen to Roy, November 26, 1868, *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Hazen to Sherman, June 30, 1869, in *Report*, 449, p. 300.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

retaliation. On December 16 came news that Sheridan, with the Seventh Cavalry under Custer, and the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer regiment, were moving down the Washita. Hazen was immediately concerned about the safety of the Kiowa and Comanche camps situated along the valley of the river. Already on December 14 Hazen had taken the precaution to write to Sherman: "General Sheridan should understand that my camps extend up and down the Washita for about thirty miles, and some miles south."⁴³ Fearing that Sheridan might attack the camps resting under his promise of security, Hazen promptly dispatched two runners with the following note:⁴⁴

HEADQUARTERS SOUTHERN INDIAN DISTRICT
PORT COBB, 9 P.M., DEC. 18, 1868

To the Officer commanding troops in the field:

Indians have just brought in word that our troops today reached the Washita some twenty miles above here. I send this to say that all the camps this side of the point reported to have been reached, are friendly, and have not been on the warpath this season. If this reaches you, it would be well to communicate at once with Satanta or Black Eagle, chiefs of the Kiowas, near where you now are, who will readily inform you of the position of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, also of my camp.

Respectfully,

(Signed) "W. B. Hazen,

"Dvt. Major General"

A group of Kiowas intercepted the messengers and kept one as a hostage. The second was escorted onward until contact was made with Sheridan and Custer on December 17, near the present site of Cloud Chief.⁴⁵ The officers were obviously provoked by the letter from the "Peace Commissioners' agent." An all-out attack on a Kiowa village was to have commenced momentarily. Custer claimed the Kiowas had been vitally involved in the Battle of the Washita and therefore did not deserve protection. In his reports and later accounts he frankly charged Hazen had been "completely deceived" and "misled" by the Indians, and had seriously erred in preventing the attack on the 17th.⁴⁶ Sheridan regretted to pass up a chance to "hit the Kiowas" but did not feel he could ignore Hazen's letter.⁴⁷ He believed that labeling the Kiowas friendly was a "joke," and subsequently said that if

⁴³ Hazen to Sherman, December 14, 1868, S-S Papers.

⁴⁴ Sheridan Papers.

⁴⁵ George H. Shirk, "Campaigning With Sheridan: A Farrier's Diary, *The Chronicles of Oklahoma*, Vol. XXXVII (Spring, 1956), p. 80.

⁴⁶ Report of Operations of the Command of Brevet Major General George A. Custer, from December 7 to December 22, 1868, Sheridan Papers; George A. Custer, *Wold Life on the Plains* (St. Louis, 1911), 258 ff; Hazen, "Some Corrections," p. 298.

⁴⁷ Sheridan to Sherman, December 19, 1868, quoted in Manypenny, *Our Indian Wars*, p. 235; P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan*, II (New York, 1889), p. 334.

Hazen had not interfered "the Indian problem on the Texas frontier" would have been solved at that time.⁶⁸ Hazen was convinced that the Kiowas and Comanches, as a group, did not participate in the Battle of Washita and had not been on the warpath since his agreement with them at Fort Larned. In this view he was supported by Alvord, who had remained at Fort Cobb under special assignment to supply Sherman with data on Indian movements, and interpreters H. P. Jones and Philip McCusker.⁶⁹

Hazen admitted that undoubtedly some individual Indians from those bands had been with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes from time to time. He was likewise cognizant that some individuals had gone on raids into Texas. But it had been consistently established and reported by the officers at Fort Cobb that the bands with whom agreements had been made in Kansas had not engaged in any hostilities since. Hazen was only fulfilling a trust and his assigned duty when he sought to assure the safety of the bands under his charge. Sherman himself virtually dictated the course of procedure Hazen followed on December 18 when he sent him the following instructions: "Every appearance about Fort Cobb should be suggestive of an earnest desire to afford a place of refuge where the peaceable Indians may receive food and be safe against the troops . . . If you have not already notified General Sheridan of the fact that some of the Kiowas are peaceful, get word to him in some way, lest he pursue them and stampede your whole family."⁷⁰

After reluctantly agreeing to honor Hazen's later, Custer seized Satanta and Lone Wolf to be held as hostages until all the Kiowas would report to Fort Cobb. Many of the camps, thoroughly suspicious of the huge army before them, fled helter skelter like a herd of scared buffalo. Many came in to Cobb promptly; others did not arrive until weeks later.⁷¹ Sheridan's army arrived at the post on December 18. Negotiations were undertaken with the Cheyenne and Arapaho chiefs on the basis of unconditional surrender. After considerable coaxing, threats, and troop movements, an increasing number of these Indians began to find their way in to the place of surrender. This "gathering" process extended well into the month of April, 1869. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes were then moved north to their own reservation.⁷²

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*; Hazen, "Some Corrections," p. 297.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 316-319.

⁷⁰ Quoted in W. S. Nye, *Carbine and Lance* (Norman, 1943), p. 72.

⁷¹ Sheridan to Nichols, December 24, 1868, *Sheridan Papers*; Hazen, "Some Corrections," p. 316.

⁷² Barstrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-339; See also William H. Leckie, *The Military Conquest of the Southern Plains* (Norman, 1963), pp. 114-126.

Sheridan had been at Fort Cobb only about a week when he decided to abandon the site for a more favorable location. A reconnaissance party composed of Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson, Hazen, and Major George A. Forsyth left that post on December 27 to investigate other possible sites.⁷¹ The group found what they considered an ideal location near the junction of Medicine Bluff and Cache creeks, approximately thirty-six miles south of the fort. Here was plenty of water, grass, and building material. Grierson and Hazen both considered the place had definite advantages over Fort Cobb. Sheridan accepted their recommendation and by January 10 all the troops had been transferred to the new post, first called Camp Wichita but later named Fort Sill.⁷² Sheridan strongly advised Hazen to move his Indians to Camp Wichita also; therefore as soon as the troops were established in their new camp, this was done.⁷³ At the new post the Indian goods were placed in a huge tent, strategically located for safe-keeping near General Sheridan's closely guarded headquarters. Some of the Kiowas and Comanches camped along Cache and Chandler creeks while others located near Mount Scott. Hazen built an adobe house on the east bank of Cache Creek which served as his winter residence. In the spring he moved into a large tent. Contracts were let for the construction of two agency warehouses and by the spring of 1869 they were ready for use.⁷⁴ The only other buildings constructed under the supervision of Hazen were two houses for Indian chiefs.⁷⁵

After the arrival of Sheridan, Hazen devoted more time to the long-range goal of adjusting the Indian to a sedentary life. Since most of his \$50,000 was necessarily diverted for food purchases the scope of all other activities was severely limited. Nevertheless, considerable efforts were made to introduce farming among the Indians. Agricultural implements, seeds, and other farming supplies were ordered from Leavenworth, Kansas, in mid-December, through the Indian Bureau. These were to be delivered on or before February 1 in time for spring planting. A. G. Boone was delegated to hire competent farmers to assist on the agencies as provided in the Treaty of Medicine Lodge.⁷⁶

⁷¹ De. Benneville R. Kelm, *Sheridan's Troopers on the Borders: A Winter Campaign on the Plains* (Philadelphia, 1885), 231; Nye, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 84, 86; Sheridan to Sherman, January 8, 1869, *Sheridan Papers*; Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II, p. 339; Kelm, *Sheridan's Troopers on the Borders*, pp. 255-256.

⁷³ Sheridan to Sherman, January 8, 1869, *Sheridan Papers*.

⁷⁴ Nye, *op. cit.*, pp. 84, 102.

⁷⁵ Hazen to Sherman, June 30, 1869, in *Report, 1869*, p. 392.

⁷⁶ A. G. Boone to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 13, 1868, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81 MSS, Central Superintendency, Kiowa Agency, National Archives, Washington D.C., Microcopy 334, Roll No. 375.

During the spring months, 1,200 acres of prairie sod were plowed, many fields were fenced, 300 acres of corn were planted, and numerous gardens were started by the Indians with the help of the agency farmers. Fortunately for the success of the work, a wet spring was experienced and crops produced well. Some of the Indians raised enough corn, watermelons, and vegetables to be able to market a surplus at the trading post. Hazen boasted that the garden plots were "as cleanly kept as the best gardens in Ohio."⁷⁹ Amazingly enough, even some of the Comanche chiefs were stimulated to help hoe the corn and vegetables. Generally, however, it was left to the squaws to do the hard labor. As a result, only seventy-two acres were put in cultivation by the Comanches in 1869.

It was difficult to make farmers out of the Kiowas. The few fields of corn started for them were used to pasture their ponies as soon as a good stand was evident.⁸⁰ The Wichita and affiliated tribes, traditionally agriculturists, were also provided assistance to reestablish farming activities. The Wichitas were a peaceful and docile people who had been forced out of the Washita Valley during the Civil War. When they returned after the war they found their homes and farms destroyed and their lands assigned to other tribes by the Medicine Lodge treaties. Hazen found them occupying both sides of the Washita near Fort Cobb in a very "destitute condition" and decided to include them in the food distribution program.⁸¹ He was impressed with the desire of these neglected people for their own plots of ground, as well as with their cooperative spirit. On January 20 he appointed Philip McCusker as acting agent of the Wichita and affiliated tribes. McCusker was instructed to take necessary measures to assure farm plots for all the Indians of the Wichita tribe.⁸²

Ground was broken for these Indians in the Eureka Valley bottom lands immediately to the east of Fort Cobb. Farmers were employed to instruct and assist them in the planting of corn, beans, peas, melons, and other vegetables. Hazen's efforts in their behalf were greatly appreciated by tribal members. One chief extolled him as "a good man who aided us all he could."⁸³ On the whole, Hazen felt well-pleased with the progress made in

⁷⁹ Hazen to Sherman, June 30, 1869 in *Report, 1869*, pp. 382, 383.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 384-385.

⁸¹ Hazen to Sherman, November 9, 1868, S-S Papers.

⁸² Hazen to Interpreter Philip McCusker, January 20, 1869. Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81 MSS, Central Superintendency, Wichita Agency, National Archives, Washington D.C., Microcopy 234, Roll No. 529; Wichita (free-farmers, Indian Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

⁸³ International Council File, May, 1875, Indian Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

the realm of farming during the Spring of 1869. It would be left to others to struggle to build on the foundation he had laid.

Continuing Indian raids were the most frustrating problem faced by Hazen as special agent. He had absolutely no sympathy for any participants in such excursions and consistently advocated that strict measures be employed to deal with the problem. Immediately upon his arrival on the reservation Hazen stated that the "old and pernicious habit of marauding in Texas" should be "checked at whatever cost." This, he advised, could not be accomplished by the Indian agent who was powerless to do more than cajole and issue hollow warnings; nor could it be done with the two companies of troops he had on hand. The problem would only be solved, he asserted, by the government dictating its own terms and then backing them up with the presence of a sufficiently strong military force. "Old gray headed men here laugh," Hazen said, "when told the Government will punish, and say they have been told that since they were children."¹⁴

Although unable to effectively cope with the Texas raiders because of his small force, Hazen kept careful record of all individuals and parties participating in such raids. He also attempted to recover stolen property and locate white captives among the tribes. When Sheridan arrived with his army in December he was presented with the evidence gathered against various members of the Kiowa and Comanche bands. Hazen's information on their depredations, including accounts of various killings and robberies, was documented with reports prepared by McCusker, Alvord, Walkley, and several Texans. Hazen believed that the guilty individuals had forfeited every right under their treaties, as well as of humanity, and recommended to Sheridan that they be dealt with accordingly. He stated his views bluntly: "To hang all the principal participants in this outlawry, and to disarm and dismount the rest, with an ample force stationed among them is, in my opinion, the mildest remedy that promises a certain cure."¹⁵ Sheridan took no specific action on the first part of this recommendation but promised sufficient troops to discourage or punish any such violations in the future.

The following spring, shortly after Sheridan had withdrawn from the area, small parties began once again to get the "roaming fever." They crossed the Red River and struck over a wide area of Texas. Colonel Grierson, commander at Fort Sill, attributed the renewed raiding activity to the scarcity and poor quality of the food supply. He agreed with the Indians who complained

¹⁴ Hazen to Sherman, November 16, 1868, S-5 Papers.

¹⁵ Hazen to Sheridan, December 24, 1868. An enclosure in Sheridan to Nichols, December 27, 1868, Sheridan Papers.

that Hazen's ration was insufficient, even when issued in full. The red men, he found, were usually without "a mouthful of food" for two or three days prior to each distribution. The quality of beef at the agency, in comparison to buffalo or young Texas steers, likewise left something to be desired. Grierson questioned the wisdom of buying low standard beef just in order to save a few cents a day on an Indian. Such a policy, he complained, tended to drive them off the reservation and the savings made were far exceeded by the financial expense required to get them back.⁶⁶

When the raids first commenced in the spring, Hazen warned the Indians that troops would be used to hound down the outlaws and to mete out severe punishment. But when he later requested the deployment of troops, Grierson refused to take any significant action. Thus his own strong threats of action against the guilty Indians could not be backed up. The old gray haired men could laugh some more.⁶⁷

In his final report from Indian Territory, Hazen was highly critical of the military command for not supporting him in his efforts to stymie the raiding activity. The lack of ability or desire to chasten, he contended, would be the downfall of the reservation system. Without it, he predicted, the Indian would continue to come and go as he pleased and progress would be slow and uncertain.⁶⁸

Hazen's services as special agent were concluded on June 30, 1869. By that time Quaker agents were on hand to continue the work he had begun. Although he wished to see the army take over the Indian affairs he felt confident that Lawrie Tatum and his assistants would administer the agency with efficiency and success, if given proper support. The Quakers, "with their industry, practical ability and known probity," would be a definite improvement over the previous system, which he considered a "burlesque upon the government and a swindle upon the Indian."⁶⁹

W. B. Hazen demonstrated earnest application and marked efficiency in performing the varied and arduous duties associated with the placement of the Southern Plains Indians on reservations. A military agent without military authority, and with duties only vaguely defined, he had been forced to rely upon his own ingenuity and resourcefulness. By providing for the needs of thousands of Indians during a difficult transitional

⁶⁶ E. H. Grierson to the Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, April 7, 1869, *Sheridan Papers*.

⁶⁷ Hazen to Sherman, June 30, 1869, *Report, 1869*, p. 393.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 394.

period, he helped them accept the inevitable and adjust to their new and restricted way of life. In a period of less than a year, only a small start could be made. Much still remained to be done and many of the high hopes held out for the reservation system were never realized. Nevertheless, the way had been prepared for others to seek in an effective way to lead the reluctant Indian along the white man's road. Given just treatment, careful guidance, and a "wholesome example of Christian morality," the Plains Indian, Hazen believed, could successfully be absorbed into the life of the nation.⁹⁰ These three principles formed the basis of Hazen's work during his brief but significant tenure in southwestern Indian Territory.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 396.