

The Final Campaign




The Confederate Offensive of 1864

*By Tom Franzmann**

Mention of the famous Indian leader, Stand Watie, usually brings a nod of recognition from a native Oklahoman. His legendary career spanned three decades of the nineteenth century and is outlined in the majority of Oklahoma history textbooks. From a prominent leader of the removal faction of his tribe in the 1830s, Watie became principal chief of the southern faction of the Cherokee Nation during the Civil War. He is distinguished as the only Indian to become a Confederate general officer as well as being one of the last Confederate leaders to surrender in 1865.¹

Unfortunately, this attention to Watie and his daring operations from 1863 to 1865 have overshadowed the importance of the entire Confederate offensive conducted in Indian Territory during the summer and fall of 1864. This major campaign, led by Confederate Major General Samuel Bell Maxey, deserves closer attention. Generally speaking, the common interpretation of the campaign judges the Confederates to have fallen short of their objectives. Maxey's inability to capture Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Fort Gibson in the Cherokee Nation prevented the attainment of significant Confederate results. As the popular impression continues, despite this reversal, Watie and



Major General Samuel Bell Maxey, Confederate commander of Indian Territory, directed the last major offensive against Northern occupation forces at Fort Gibson during the summer and fall of 1864. After the war he would be elected to the United States Senate from Texas (Courtesy Texas State Archives).

his brigade of Cherokee cavalry saved the local Confederate cause from complete demoralization with two isolated but impressive victories at Pleasant Bluff and Cabin Creek in June and September. In addition to bolstering southern morale these engagements netted the Confederates desperately needed supplies.

Contrary to this narrow interpretation, a detailed examination of the Fort Smith campaign reveals otherwise. Maxey's strategic operations from June until September proved to be of greater significance than Watie's tactical success during that same period. Watie's brigade served in only a limited, albeit important, capacity during the campaign. One must bear in mind that the strength of Watie's brigade represented less than twenty percent of the entire Confederate force in Indian Territory.² Rather than isolated engagements, Watie's triumphs at Pleasant Bluff and Cabin Creek were the two most impressive examples of numerous Confederate minor victories won under the strategic direction of Maxey during the campaign.

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Nor did Confederate primary objectives include the capture of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. The basis for the interpretation that Maxey's Fort Smith campaign was barren of significant results is the failure of Confederate sorties to bring about the capture of these two installations. Support for this conclusion can be found in a letter from Maxey to the Confederate Commissioner of Indian Affairs in which he discussed a grandiose scheme for the capture of the two forts and the liberation of Arkansas from Federal control. Significantly, this communication was not written until late in August after the campaign was well underway and did not express initial Confederate objectives in launching the offensive.³

Much more revealing is the communication from Maxey to his commander at Trans-Mississippi Department headquarters dated July 15, in which he stated that the Confederate strategy in Indian Territory would be to "hold the forces at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith in check" and possibly force an evacuation.⁴ Apparently, the capture of Fort Gibson and Fort Smith was not the primary Confederate objective but rather additional incentives. Maxey realized that Confederate possession of the forts could only be maintained temporarily as long as the Federals retained control of Little Rock, thereby negating the Arkansas River as a Confederate supply line. Therefore, to dismiss the Fort Smith campaign as insignificant due to the Confederate failure to occupy these two outposts must be considered unjustified.

But can Maxey's Fort Smith campaign be considered victorious? United States military theory identifies five objectives of a successful offensive operation: to destroy enemy forces, to deny required resources to the enemy, to seize enemy terrain or territory, to develop enemy dispositions, and to divert the enemy's attention to other areas.⁵ The success of Maxey's campaign can be judged in relation to the fulfillment of these five military objectives.

The destruction of the Federal forces did not involve the annihilation of the northern troops or the rout of their principal field force. The strength of the defensive works at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson protected the Union army from full scale Confederate assaults. Instead, Maxey destroyed the Union army's effectiveness through an indirect strategy. As Maxey's command was comprised primarily of cavalry units, the Confederate commander realized that the elimination of the Federal cavalry brigade at Fort Smith would insure superior Confederate mobility and the retention of the initiative. Union infantry units confined to their fortifications at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson would be removed as an effective field force.

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
Therefore, the Confederate army executed a plan which reduced the Federal cavalry brigade to an impotent force. During four days of aggressive operations in the vicinity of Fort Smith in late July, Confederate attacks were immensely successful, inflicting over 400 losses on the Federal defenders. On July 27, 1,500 southern cavalrymen under Brigadier General Richard M. Gano defeated a large detachment of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry within five miles of Fort Smith at Massard Prairie. The Confederates destroyed the unit's base camp and captured more than 100 prisoners prior to withdrawing. Federal cavalry pursuit proved ineffective when the Confederate Choctaw battalion ambushed the northern soldiers sixteen miles southwest of Fort Smith at Devil's Backbone Mountain.⁶

On July 31, the Confederates continued to apply pressure with attacks on the Federal forces holding the main Fort Smith road and easily captured the outlying camps. Although Watie urged an immediate assault on the Fort Smith defenses, the Confederate field commander, Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper, wisely refrained due to the strength of the fortifications and a shortage of Southern artillery. At nightfall the Confederate army withdrew while sniper fire deceived the Federals as to their departure. With his cavalry force crippled, the Federal commander, Brigadier General John M. Thayer, proved unable to determine the movements of the Confederate horsemen. Consequently, the Union army remained timidly confined to its defensive works at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.⁷

In addition to the combat attrition of northern cavalry troopers, Confederate strategy called for the destruction of Federal haying operations. On July 28, Southern cavalry dispersed a Union haying operation northwest of Fort Smith at Blackburn's Prairie. At Gunter's Prairie on August 24 a force of 500 Confederates attacked an equal number of Federals in their camp north of the Arkansas River. The Confederates captured fourteen prisoners, 150 horses and mules, and burned a large amount of hay. At Flat Rock in September, Southern forces burned approximately 1,000 tons of hay after defeating a detachment of Negro soldiers. Additionally, a summer drought followed by heavy rains damaged the little hay the Confederates left untouched.⁸

The results of these Confederate aggressions soon had a notable impact on Thayer's ability to maintain an effective cavalry force. Owing to the shortage of forage, the return of the Second Kansas Cavalry regiment to Fort Smith early in August had only a slight impact due to widespread conversion of cavalry troopers to infantrymen. (This regiment had been sent to the Little Rock region to bolster

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Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper was the Confederate field commander who executed Maxey's strategy in the Indian Territory. Cooper was General Stand Watie's immediate superior during the victories at Cabin Creek and Pleasant Bluff (Courtesy OHS).

the weak Federal cavalry force pursuing Confederate General Joseph Shelby's Missouri cavalry brigade; due to the defensive orientation of the Union Trans-Mississippi Department in the summer of 1864, all Federal commanders suffered from a shortage of cavalry units.)⁹ The tri-monthly report of the First Arkansas (Union) Cavalry indicated that on July 31, only 104 horses were available in a regiment of 837 men present for duty. By early September, a detachment of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry could mount only a dozen men of the unit's 118 personnel. Due to the scarcity of horses, Federal authorities denied the request of the commander at Fort Gibson to mount 1,000 members of the Union Indian Brigade.¹⁰

Confined within their entrenchments and unable to contain Confederate activity, the morale of the northern troops began to suffer. A member of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry later recorded that "predictions were freely made that before the end of the year serious disaster was almost certain to come to the Federal forces at Fort Smith."¹¹ Southern intelligence sources informed Maxey that the spirits of the northern troops were low and desertion had become a problem. Union

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soldiers openly asserted that if the southerners attacked Fort Smith, they would take the post easily.¹² Even General Thayer became demoralized. As early as July 30, the Federal commander admitted his army had been neutralized as an effective field force. In his report, he stated:

my cavalry are almost useless as cavalry for the want of serviceable horses. I am only prevented from moving out and fighting (the Confederates) by the want of cavalry and artillery horses. I could not move my batteries twenty miles in this hot weather before half of the horses would give out.¹³

Throughout the campaign, Maxey designed Confederate operations to deny vital resources to the Federal army. Southern cavalry and partisan activity in the Cherokee Nation and northwestern Arkansas cut telegraph lines, ambushed patrols, intercepted mail and supplies, and intimidated the pro-Union civilian population in the area. In the demonstration against Fort Smith in late July, southern forces destroyed \$130,000 worth of Federal supplies and equipment. At Cabin Creek in September the Confederates captured 120 wagons, 740 mules, and clothing.¹⁴ At Massard Prairie, the Confederate commander reported the capture of "200 Sharps rifles, 400 six-shooters, a number of horses, some sutler's stores and camp equipment." The Federal army also lost supplies in encounters with Maxey's Confederates at Pleasant Bluff, Marston's skirmish, Gunter's Prairie, Flat Rock, Lee's Creek, and Blackburn's Prairie.¹⁵

Aggressive Confederate activity additionally forced the relocation of pro-Union civilians living in the Cherokee Nation and western Arkansas to the protection of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. The presence of over 18,000 pro-Union refugees obtaining subsistence from the Federal commissary strained transportation facilities and embarrassed attempts to maintain adequate supply depots at either installation. A summer drought, which ruined local crops, and the increased activity of cattle rustlers also hampered the Federal supply effort.¹⁶

To prevent the resupply of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, Maxey's Confederates cut both the Arkansas River supply line and the overland supply line from Fort Scott, Kansas. On June 15, Watie's brigade struck at the river supply line at Pleasant Bluff between Fort Gibson and Fort Smith. Attacking from ambush at a bend in the Arkansas River, the Confederate Indians captured the *J. R. Williams*, a supply steamer carrying \$120,000 worth of supplies to Fort Gibson. The Confederates destroyed the majority of the supplies upon the

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approach of a Federal infantry column from Fort Smith. In conjunction with Watie's operation, Confederate Major General Sterling Price's cavalry division conducted similar operations in Arkansas disrupting navigation between Fort Smith and Little Rock. To insure the interdiction of the Arkansas River supply line, Maxey advanced his field army under General Cooper to Skullyville on July 19.¹⁷

From their new position on the south bank of the Arkansas River, the Confederates raided the overland supply routes to Kansas and Missouri. Late in August, Confederate cavalry captured a small Federal supply train at Lee's Creek north of Fort Smith. A few weeks later, Maxey detached Generals Watie and Gano with their brigades to intercept a Federal supply train of 250 wagons moving through the Cherokee Nation from Fort Scott to Fort Smith. On September 19, the southern cavalry attacked the Union supply train at Cabin Creek in the northern part of the Cherokee Nation. After brisk fighting the Union escort withdrew and the Confederates captured food, clothing, and other provisions valued at \$1.5 million. Following a skirmish with a Federal relief column along Pryor Creek, the Confederates broke contact and withdrew with their spoils to Perryville in the Choctaw Nation.¹⁸

Following the Cabin Creek raid, the Confederate forces remained within striking distance of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. The Federals, however, refused to dispatch any further supply trains and Thayer's soldiers remained within their fortifications on reduced rations. Eventually the approach of winter required the majority of the Confederate army to retire to the Red River to establish semi-permanent quarters and to obtain forage for the cavalry horses. Only after the Confederate withdrawal did the Federal authorities attempt to re-supply the two forts. Despite his involvement in the crucial Petersburg campaign prior to the presidential election of 1864, General U. S. Grant, commander of the Union armies, was aware of and expressed concern over the critical supply situation at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.¹⁹

Naturally, Federal retention of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson limited the impact of Confederate territorial gains during the campaign. Nevertheless, Confederate-controlled territory extended to the Arkansas River and guerrilla activity flared in both the Cherokee Nation and northwestern Arkansas. Although Confederate control was temporary, the occupation of the Arkansas River valley did achieve profitable results. Pro-southern Indian refugee families were able to encamp unmolested in different portions of the Choctaw and

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Chickasaw Nations. Confederate operations in the vicinity of Fort Smith covered the migration of southern families in northwestern Arkansas to safety farther south. Moreover, Maxey's aggressiveness intimidated the pro-Union Indians in the Cherokee Nation.²⁰ United States Indian Agent Isaac Colman reported early in September that the "presence of the rebel army in the Indian Territory south of the Arkansas River has the effect to overawe and keep down all the loyal sentiment of the people."²¹

The advanced position of the Confederate army also created a base of operations for intensified guerrilla activity in the Cherokee Nation, northwestern Arkansas, and southwestern Missouri. Critically short of cavalry units, Thayer was forced to commit 300 troopers to chasing partisans in southwestern Missouri and northwestern Arkansas during the month of August. In July, Federal commanders in southern Kansas expressed anxiety when reports located 300 southern partisans within forty-five miles of Fort Scott. Union patrols clashed with guerrilla forces at Mayesville, Arkansas on July 20, Carthage, Missouri on July 21, and Gerald Mountain in Arkansas on August 24. In mid-September, local Federal authorities ordered all available cavalry to converge on Fayetteville when 200 southern partisans threatened to capture a supply train. During the same period, the Federal commander at Fort Scott reported that guerrilla activity had disrupted communication with Fort Gibson. Although not a permanent conquest, Confederate territorial gains did result in intensified pressure on the two Federal forts and carried the conflict behind Federal lines.²²

As a result of faulty intelligence reports, Thayer rarely knew what the intentions of the Confederate commander were. At one point in September, the Federal commander pleaded for sizeable reinforcements as he had "reason to believe that nearly all the rebel forces in Texas" were concentrating in his front. In fact, Maxey had received no significant reinforcement. Superior Confederate mobility and the defensive posture of the Union army left Thayer blind to enemy movements. With all available cavalry employed as supply train escorts, Thayer neglected vitally important intelligence efforts.²³

At Maxey's Fort Towson headquarters, the Confederate intelligence network kept the southern commander accurately assessed of Federal strength and troop dispositions. Captured Federal mail and at least one spy in Fort Smith provided Maxey with information concerning northern morale, supply problems, and troop movements, in addition to supplying the Confederate leader with plans of the Fort Smith defensive works.²⁴

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Confederate cavalry probes provided additional information and prevented Federal reconnaissance missions from leaving the protection of the forts. Wiley Britton observed that since Maxey had taken the offensive "no Federal outpost could, with safety, be kept out more than ten to fifteen miles from Fort Smith south of the Arkansas River or in the direction of Boggy Depot."²⁵ United States Indian Agent, W. G. Coffin, noted that "everything done out of range of the guns of the fort has to be done under an escort or guard."²⁶ Thoroughly passified, Thayer failed to commit any aggressive action when General Sterling Price's battered and defeated Confederate Army of Missouri retreated though the Cherokee Nation following its defeat at Westport, Missouri in October.²⁷

When reviewing the Fort Smith campaign from a strategical standpoint, one immediately becomes conscious of the Confederate effort in Indian Territory to divert Thayer's command from other operations. The most significant aspect of belligerent Confederate activity in 1864 was the inability of Thayer to launch an offensive or cavalry raid of his own. Maxey never relinquished the initiative, thereby preventing movements south from Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. In retrospect, the Confederate offensive proved to be an excellent defense of northern Texas and the pro-southern Indian refugees along the Red River.²⁸

The defense of northern Texas was especially critical to the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy. A rich agricultural region, northern Texas also contained a prisoner of war camp. An important foundry at Tyler, Texas turned out about 2 million cartridges and 1.7 million small arms between April 1, 1864 and April 1, 1865. Additionally, supplies for the Confederate army operating in Arkansas were drawn from Texas along the Red River.²⁹ Maxey identified the importance of his mission in a letter to Trans-Mississippi Department headquarters on July 11 when he wrote that "the salvation of the best supply district of the Confederacy is guaranteed by the successful defense of the Indian Territory."³⁰

Maxey's aggressive policy insured the retention of loyalty of the Five Civilized Tribes to the Confederacy. As one Confederate officer expressed it:

devoted as they appear to us and much as they detest our enemies, interest and their love of home and country, which tradition has shown us is characteristic of the race, may prove stronger ties than a treaty but poorly complied with by us. Forced back to the Red River, their homes left to the mercy of a vindictive foe, they may forsake us, and in forsaking become our enemies.³¹

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Instead, numerous small scale Confederate victories had a beneficial impact on the pro-southern Indians and reaffirmed their faith in the Confederacy. Maxey established a printing press at his Fort Towson headquarters to disseminate congratulatory messages and other propaganda to the Indians. Rededicating their adherence to the Confederacy, the Choctaw and Cherokee regiments re-enlisted for the duration of the war. Watie's and Gano's brigades received the thanks of the Confederate Congress for their victory at Cabin Creek, and Confederate propaganda agencies used Maxey's campaign to promote morale elsewhere in the Confederacy. The supreme Confederate commander in the Trans-Mississippi issued General Orders from his headquarters praising the Cabin Creek raid as the "most brilliant of the war."³² Elias Boudinot, Cherokee delegate to the Confederate Congress in Richmond, wrote to Stand Watie that the "whole country is alive with the glorious news of your success."³³

One should bear in mind that other Confederate armies in the Trans-Mississippi region also were active during this time frame. Southern military forces operated against Little Rock and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, as well as along the lower Mississippi River. In September, approximately 12,000 Confederate cavalry under General Sterling Price moved unopposed past Thayer's eastern flank and into southeastern Missouri. Maxey's partisans and cavalry severed communications between Fort Smith and Federal Department headquarters at Little Rock for months at a time rendering Thayer helpless to participate effectively in strategic operations against the simultaneous, aggressive Confederate operations. With over 6,000 Union soldiers committed to Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, Federal authorities ultimately required 14,000 reinforcements (diverted from the Atlanta campaign) to drive Price out of Missouri. Throughout the campaign, Thayer's force remained inactive and, as previously noted, permitted the defeated Confederates to retreat leisurely through the Cherokee Nation.³⁴

The critique of superiors can often serve as an indication of the success of a military campaign. Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith, Confederate commander in the Trans-Mississippi, praised Maxey's performance stating that the Indian Territory commander had administered his duties with "skill, judgement, and success."³⁵ Federal authorities were less pleased with General Thayer's conduct during the campaign. On September 26, Major General Henry W. Halleck ordered an investigation into charges of "fraud and inefficiency at Fort Smith and the Indian Territory."³⁶ Four months later, Federal authorities removed Thayer as commander of the Dis-

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trict of the Frontier and reassigned him to command of a single regiment of Kansas cavalry and an artillery battery at Saint Charles, Arkansas.³⁷

Although Maxey's campaign of 1864 did not achieve a decisive victory such as the annihilation of the Federal army or the evacuation of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, the Confederate operations did attain significant results. Through skillful management of such limited resources that a Confederate officer, inspecting the Indian Territory in July, declared that logistically an offensive operation was not feasible, Maxey accomplished each of the five purposes of offensive operations: the campaign destroyed the combat effectiveness of the Federal forces; it interdicted supply lines and denied Federal troops and destitute pro-Union refugees vital resources; and Maxey temporarily extended Confederate territorial possession to the Arkansas River and guerrilla activity into northwestern Arkansas, southwestern Missouri, and the Cherokee Nation. Finally, confined within the defensive works at Forts Smith and Gibson, Thayer's army was effectively neutralized and prevented from participation in strategic developments. As General Maxey reported: "the campaign in this Territory since my return last spring from Arkansas has been eminently successful."³⁸

ENDNOTES

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¹ See Joseph B. Thoburn and Muriel H. Wright, *Oklahoma: A History of the State and its People* (4 vols., New York: Lewis, 1929), vol. 1, pp. 346-347; Edward E. Dale and Gene Aldrich, *History of Oklahoma* (Edmond, Oklahoma: Thompson Book and Supply, 1972), pp. 160-178.

² Inspection Report of Captain B. W. Marston near Boggy Depot on December 18, 1864 in Allen C. Ashcraft, "Confederate Indian Troop Conditions in 1864," *The Chronicles of Oklahoma* Vol. 41 (Winter, 1963), p. 444. General Maxey's District of Indian Territory contained approximately 4,000 available troops organized into the Fifth Texas Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Richard M. Gano (29th, 30th, 33rd Texas Cavalry regiments, 1st Texas Partisan Rangers, 1st Texas/Arizona battalion, and Good's and Well's Texas battalions) and the Indian Cavalry Division commanded by Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper which consisted of three brigades: Brigadier General Stand Watie's First Indian Brigade (1st, 2d Cherokee regiments, Scale's Cherokee battalion, 1st, 2d Creek regiments, Kenard's Creek squadron, 1st Osage battalion, and 1st Seminole battalion), Colonel Tandy Walker's Second Indian Brigade (2d Choctaw regiment, 1st Chickasaw battalion, 1st Choctaw battalion, 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw battalion, and Washington's reserve squadron), and Colonel

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Daniel McIntosh's Third Indian Brigade (formed from Creek and Seminole units attached to Watie's brigade). Unattached were Krumbhaar's Seventh Mounted Artillery battalion (Dashiell's, Stafford's, and Howell's Texas batteries) and the 20th Texas Cavalry regiment and the 1st Texas sharpshooter battalion.

³ Maxey to S. S. Scott, August 23, 1864, File 132, Papers of Samuel Bell Maxey, Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; also see Keun Sang Lee, "The Capture of the *J. R. Williams*," *The Chronicles of Oklahoma* Vol. 60 (Spring, 1982), pp. 22, 32.

⁴ Maxey to Boggs, July 15, 1864, U. S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Four Series, 129 vols., General Index; Atlas. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), Series I, volume 41, part 2, p. 1007, hereinafter cited as *O.R.* Brigadier General John Thayer's District of the Frontier contained approximately 6,300 soldiers of which slightly over 2,000 were cavalymen. The troops were organized into four brigades with the 13th Kansas Cavalry regiment as garrison for the posts of Fort Smith and Van Buren and the 1st Arkansas (Union) Cavalry regiment as garrison for Fayetteville. The Fourth or Indian Brigade commanded by Colonel Stephen Wattles (1st, 2d, 3rd Indian Home Guard regiments and Company M, 14th Kansas Cavalry) occupied Fort Gibson. The First Brigade (Colonel John Edwards: 1st Arkansas, 18th Iowa, and 12th Kansas regiments and 2d Battery/Kansas Light Artillery), the Second Brigade (Colonel John Williams: 1st, 2d Kansas Colored regiments, 5 companies of the 11th U. S. Colored regiment, 54th U. S. Colored regiment, 1st Battery/Arkansas Light Artillery, and 3rd Battery/Kansas Light Artillery), and the Third Brigade (Colonel William R. Judson: 2d, 6th, 14th Kansas Cavalry regiments) comprised Thayer's principal field force at Fort Smith.

⁵ *Theory and Dynamics of Tactical Operations* (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Army, 1972), p. 342.

⁶ Thayer's Report, July 30, 1864, Morehead's Report, July 29, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, pp. 23–25; Wiley Britton, *Civil War on the Western Border* (2 vols., New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1890–1904), 2, pp. 530–533; Muriel H. Wright and LeRoy H. Fischer, *Civil War Sites in Oklahoma* (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Historical Society, 1967, p. 30.

⁷ Cooper's Report, August 10, 1864, Stewart's Report, August 2, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, pp. 25–26, 31–36; Wiley Britton, *Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War* (Kansas City, Missouri: Franklin Hudson, 1922), pp. 427–428; Sanborn to Greene, August 5, 1864, Scott to Seddon, August 23, 1864, Cooper to Maxey, July 9, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, pp. 574, 1008, 1079; Earl G. Curtis, "John Milton Thayer," *Nebraska History*, Vol. 28 (October, 1947), p. 237.

⁸ Cooper's Report, August 10, 1864, Maxey to Anderson, September 3, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, pp. 32, 279; Maxey to Smith, August 18, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 1072; Price to Wattles, September 10, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, p. 140; Britton, *Union Indian Brigade*, p. 429; Edward E. Dale, "The Cherokees in the Confederacy," *Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 13 (May, 1947), pp. 160–185; Benson J. Lossing, *A History of the Civil War* (New York: War Memorial Association, 1912), p. 416.

⁹ Edwin C. Bearss and Arrell M. Gibson, *Fort Smith Little Gibraltar on the Arkansas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p. 283.

¹⁰ Maxey to Boggs, August 31, 1864, Green to Thayer, July 25, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, pp. 124, 1096; Thayer to Green, September 8, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, p. 105.

¹¹ Britton, *Union Indian Brigade*, p. 434.

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¹² Ford to Cooper, July 5, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 1008.

¹³ Thayer's Report, July 30, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, p. 24.

¹⁴ Britton, *Union Indian Brigade*, p. 402; Maxey to Boggs, October 1, 1864, Cooper's Report, August 10, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, pp. 34, 779.

¹⁵ Maxey's Report, July 30, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, p. 29; Larry C. Rampp, "Negro Troop Activity in Civil War," *The Chronicles of Oklahoma*, Vol. 47 (Spring, 1969), p. 551.

¹⁶ Britton, *Civil War on the Border*, p. 345; Anderson to Phillips, July 19, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 265; Cutler to Coffin, September 1, 1864, Harlan to Coffin, September 30, 1864, Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1864, U. S. Department of the Interior, *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1864* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1865), pp. 304, 309, 312. Hereinafter cited as *Commissioner Reports*; Tom Holman, "William G. Coffin, Lincoln's Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern Superintendency," *Kansas Historical Quarterly* Vol. 39 (Winter, 1973), pp. 509-510.

¹⁷ Bearss and Gibson, *Fort Smith*, pp. 284-285; Britton, *Union Indian Brigade*, pp. 401-408; Britton, *Civil War on the Border*, pp. 349-351; Franks, *Stand Watie*, pp. 162-163; Larry C. Rampp, "Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Territory," Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1968, pp. 89-94; Worten M. Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1966, pp. 71-73; Coffin to Dole, June 16, 1864, *Commissioner Reports*, p. 343; Larry C. Rampp, "Confederate Sinking of the *J. R. Williams*," *Journal of the West*, Vol. 11 (January 1972) pp. 49-50; James D. Morrison, "Capture of the *J. R. Williams*," *The Chronicles of Oklahoma* Vol. 42 (Summer 1964), pp. 105-108.

¹⁸ Shannon to Cooper, August 26, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 1087; Britton, *Union Indian Brigade*, p. 402; Isaac Colman, September 1, 1864, *Commissioner Reports*, p. 314; Sanborn's Report, July 29, 1864, C. Johnson's Report, September 25, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, p. 75, 776; Boggs to Maxey, September 22, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, p. 951.

¹⁹ Thayer to Wattles, September 28, 1864, Thayer to Wattles, October 1, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, pp. 439, 531; Rampp, "Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Territory," pp. 140-141; Grant to Halleck, September 29, 1864, Halleck to Grant, September 30, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, pp. 469, 497.

²⁰ Cooper's Report, August 10, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, p. 32; Scott to Seddon, August 23, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 1079.

²¹ Isaac Colman to unknown, September 1, 1864, *Commissioner Reports*, p. 314.

²² Powell's Report, August 29, 1864, Sanborn's Report, July 29, 1864, Bishop's Report, August 31, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, pp. 75, 268-269; McKean to Charlot, July 6, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 68; Cameron to Sanborn, September 13, 1864, Jennison to Curtis, September 27, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, pp. 177, 427.

²³ Thayer to Halleck, September 22, 1864, Thayer to Steele, October 4, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, pp. 300, 609; Britton, *Civil War on the Border*, p. 343.

²⁴ Hilderand to Cooper, September 26, 1864, Cooper to Scott, September 19, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, pp. 779, 781; Magruder to Boggs, August 30, 1864, Maxey to Smith, August 18, 1864, Cooper to Maxey, July 9, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, pp. 1008, 1072, 1091; Britton, *Civil War on the Border*, p. 527; Stand Watie to Mrs. Watie, June 1, 1864, in Edward E. Dale, "Some Letters of General Stand Watie," *The Chronicles of Oklahoma*, Vol. 1 (January, 1921), p. 49.

²⁵ Britton, *Union Indian Brigade*, p. 402.

²⁶ Coffin to Dole, June 16, 1864, *Commissioner Reports*, p. 342.

²⁷ Britton, *Civil War on the Border*, p. 345.

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²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 341; Maxey to Smith, August 18, 1864, *O.R.* i, 41, pt. 2, p. 1072. Despite General Thayer's numerical superiority over Maxey's Confederates, his timid and inactive conduct during the campaign may be partially explained as conforming to the overall Federal defensive strategy in the Trans-Mississippi in 1864–65 in order to release troops for the campaigns against Richmond and Atlanta. Too much reliance should not be placed upon this explanation for it does not explain the angry reaction Thayer's passive strategy drew from the supreme Union commander, General U. S. Grant. Grant failed to understand why Thayer could not logistically support field operations if Maxey's undersupplied Confederate cavalry could do so. Grant to Halleck, September 29, 1864, Halleck to Canby, September 26, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3., pp. 373, 469.

²⁹ Portlock to Maxey, July 8, 1864, Magruder to Boggs, August 30, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, pp. 998, 1091; Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, File 132, Papers of Samuel B. Maxey; W. T. Windham, "The Problem of Supply in the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy," *Journal of Southern History* vol. 27 (May, 1961), p. 165.

³⁰ Maxey to Smith, July 11, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 1000.

³¹ Portlock to Maxey, July 8, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 999.

³² Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, File 132, Papers of Samuel B. Maxey; Scott to Seddon, August 23, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 2, p. 1079; Richard B. Harwell, ed., *The Confederate Reader* (New York: David McKay, 1957), p. 315; General Orders Number 26, September 30, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, p. 793.

³³ Boudinot to Watie, October 1, 1864, in Edward E. Dale and Gaston Litton, eds., *Cherokee Cavaliers* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p. 195.

³⁴ Thayer to Halleck, September 29, 1864, Washburn to Canby, September 11, 1864, Canby to Halleck, September 12, 1864, Halleck to Grant, September 30, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, pp. 150, 157, 475, 497; Wiley Britton, "Resume of Military Operations in Missouri and Arkansas, 1864–1865," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols., New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), 4, p. 375; John M. Harrell, "Arkansas," in Clement Evans, ed., *Confederate Military History* (13 vols., Atlanta: Confederate Publishing, 1899), 11, p. 276; *New York Times*, New York City, New York, October 25, 1864.

³⁵ Smith to Cooper, October 1, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, p. 971.

³⁶ Halleck to Canby, September 26, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 3, p. 373; Edwin C. Bearss, "Federal Generals Squabble over Fort Smith Post, 1863–1864," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 29 (Summer, 1970), pp. 119–151.

³⁷ Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue Lives of the Union Commanders* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 499.

³⁸ Edwin C. Bearss, "Confederate Action against Fort Smith Post: Early 1864," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 29 (Autumn, 1970), p. 250; Edwin C. Bearss, "General Cooper's CSA Indians Threaten Fort Smith," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 26 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 261–265; Maxey to Boggs, October 7, 1864, *O.R.*, i, 41, pt. 1, p. 780. Also see L. W. Horton, "General Sam Bell Maxey: His Defense of North Texas and the Indian Territory," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 74 (April, 1971), pp. 507–524; Nancy Jo Hobson, "Samuel Bell Maxey as Confederate Commander of Indian Territory, 1863–1865," Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1972; and Nancy Jo Hobson, "Samuel Bell Maxey as Confederate Commander in Indian Territory," in LeRoy H. Fischer, ed., *The Civil War Era in Indian Territory* (Los Angeles: Lorrin L. Morrison, 1974), pp. 94–108. Although both of these authors have stressed Maxey's important role in administrative reform and logistical operations, they have neglected his positive performance as strategical director of Confederate operations in Indian Territory.